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Return-Earnings Relation in Finland 1990-2002: Cross-Sectional Differences in Price
Anticipation of Earnings
Objectives of the Study
In an association study, the contemporaneous relationship between stock returns and accounting 
earnings is often modelled as a regression between the unexpected earnings of a financial year 
regressed on the corresponding year’s returns. Because accounting income incorporates value­
relevant information with a lag and the market becomes aware of these events before accounting 
earnings are released, it is possible to strengthen the returns earnings relation and the magnitude of 
the earnings response coefficient (ERC) by including leading period returns in the dependent 
variable, i.e. prices lead earnings. This study aims to provide evidence on the ability of prices to 
lead earnings in Finland by using the latest stock market data from the period 1990-2002. 
Additionally, it will be tested whether there are cross-sectional differences in the way in which 
adding leading period returns enhances the ERC. The ability of prices to lead earnings is 
hypothesised to be related to the quality of a firm’s information environment, which is proxied by 
size measured by market value, trading volume in a firm’s share and the relative amount of 
relationship financing.
Data
The sample comprises of 27 companies that have been continuously listed on the Helsinki Stock 
Exchange (HEX) Main List between 1.4.1990-1.4.2002. Stock return, price and trading data are 
retrieved from the HEX database at use in Helsinki School of Economics (HSE). Annual earnings 
observations and other financial information data are collected from the Research Institute for the 
Finnish Economy (RIFE) database or from the companies’ official annual accounts available for 
public viewing at the National Board of Patents and Registration.
Results
Most of the increase in the explanatory power of the tested regressions and the absolute magnitude 
of the ERCs stems from adding two leading years’ returns to the dependent variable, which is 
coherent with previous international (US, UK) evidence and analysts’ typical earnings forecast 
horizon in Finland. This implies that stock prices impound information in a similar manner relative 
to accounting earnings as in other large stock exchanges despite HEX being a relatively small and 
illiquid market place. When leading period returns are added to the dependent variable the ERCs 
increase least for firms that are small measured by market value or have had least amount of trading 
in their share. The amount of relationship capital, measured by loans from financial institutions 
divided by total assets, influences the returns earnings relation in such a way that ERCs of firms 
with a high amount of relationship capital increase the least when leading period returns are added 
and ERCs of firms with a low amount of relationship capital increase the most when leading period 
returns are added.
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Companies earnings announcements are one of the most widely covered financial news and 
highlight the importance given to accounting earnings as a specific performance measure. Given the 
massive coverage related to earnings it would be logical to assume that they contain information, 
which is of the highest relevance to firm outsiders. As it is, market specialists express their believes 
about the future of companies almost always by means of earning forecasts and managers’ 
compensation is often determined by earnings or earnings related measures. Consequently, 
recognising the value relevance of accounting numbers is of great importance for institutions 
developing accounting practices and rules in their work of “bettering” the quality of earnings in 
terms of investor value relevance. Therefore, it is only natural that the usefulness of earnings to 
investors is one of the oldest and concerted research fields in accounting history.
Usefulness of information can be understood in many different ways but in financial research the 
research conducted in the field was quite early established on measuring the way in which 
information conveyed by earnings was reflected in security prices. The earliest and one of the most 
quoted studies being the paper published by Ball and Brown (1968), in which the authors stated that 
“recent developments in capital theory provide justification for selecting the behaviour of security 
prices as an operational test of usefulness". Ball and Brown assumed, relying on an impressive 
amount of theory, that capital markets are efficient and unbiased in forming asset prices based on 
available useful information. Accordingly, prices of securities would then adjust quickly to an 
earnings announcement conditionally on the earnings having any importance to investors (new 
information). In a similar tone, Fama (1970) stresses the fact that investors do not need to worry 
about security prices being reasonable or not if they can assume that prices already fully reflect all 
available information.
The concept of earnings response coefficient (ERC) has been widely used in accounting studies 
since the late 1980s. An ERC associates unexpected earnings with unexpected returns, since we 
assume rational expectations about future earnings to already be reflected in security prices. 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to correlate the change in price (return) with unexpected earnings 
(new information) rather than with reported earnings [Lev (1989)]. Generally, the following (1) 
linear regression model is used to estimate the association between returns and earnings:
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CAR^a + ßUX.+e, (1)
CAR being the risk-adj usted return for security i over period t, UX a measure of unexpected 
earnings and e a random disturbance term respectively. The slope coefficient ß is called the 
earnings response coefficient (ERC). The returns earnings association can be measured either by 
using a return cumulation period which (i) coincide with both the earnings measurement period and 
report period, and (ii) coincide with only the earnings report or event period (usually two or three 
days around the earnings announcement). The former are called association studies and the latter 
event studies. Normally, empirical papers run tests to obtain ERCs that are afterwards compared to 
a hypothesized theoretical level based on a valuation model. Another frequently used way of 
displaying returns earnings regression results is to report the explanatory power (R2) of the model.
Despite the huge amount of time and effort devoted to the studies on the returns earnings 
relationship, most of the empirical findings still suggest that while investors do use earnings the 
extent of their usefulness is rather limited based on a contemporaneous regression (financial year’s 
unexpected accounting earnings regressed on the corresponding year’s unexpected returns; 
association study). However, several papers published in the 1990s discuss the possible problems in 
measuring the retums-eamings relation and offer various methods for practitioners to increase the 
strength of the association. One of them is to increase the time interval for calculation of returns if it 
is assumed that the weak relationship is due to earnings’ lack of timeliness in capturing value­
relevant events. Empirically it means that a financial year’s accounting earnings are not only an 
explanatory variable for the corresponding year’s returns, but previous years’ returns are included in 
the dependent variable. This was first suggested by Beaver et al. (1980) and several other papers 
afterwards have taken into account the so called lead-lag structure between earnings and returns e.g. 
Collins and Kothari (1989) were able to significantly increase the observed retums-eamings relation 
for NYSE firms. In Finland, several papers [see Martikainen and Puttonen (1993), Martikainen et 
al. (1993), Kallunki and Martikainen (1997)] have covered the phenomenon and found out that 
there is a similar effect of stock returns predicting accounting earnings for Helsinki Stock Exchange 
companies.
The amount of value-relevant information available to investors about a firm is related to the quality 
of the firm’s information environment. The ‘better’ the quality, the more accurately investors are 
able to anticipate the future development of a firm’s operations and hence the more accurately they
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are able to predict value-relevant events which will be realised in the accounting earnings of future 
periods. This will lead stock markets to price the shares of firms that have a high quality 
information environment more accurately in relation to actual future performance reflected in 
accounting amounts. Empirically the phenomenon is referred to as ‘prices leading earnings’. Some 
factors that are related to the quality of a firm’s information environment can be hypothesized to 
have an effect on the ability of its stock price to lead earnings. These include size, trading volume 
and earnings persistence among others [Collins et al. (1987), Donnelly and Walker (1995), 
Donnelly (1998)].
Other explanations apart from the ‘prices leading earnings’ for the weak observed relationship 
between returns and earnings include capital market inefficiency, deficient-GAAP and composition 
of earnings. In general, all of the explanations have support among academics and some evidence 
has been found to support all of the hypotheses. However, to date none of the explanations seem to 
stand out among the others.
1.1 Objectives of The Study
My study plans to add to the current ERC research by using the latest data from the Finnish stock 
market (Helsinki Stock Exchange, HEX). Several papers have previously shown that, as in larger 
international markets, security returns lead earnings also in Finland. My objective is to study in 
detail what the cross-sectional determinants of this lead-lag phenomenon are. The subject has not 
been previously studied in Finland, although the behaviour of a relatively small and illiquid stock 
market in terms of price formation relative to future period accounting information might be 
particularly interesting.
This paper can be seen as an extension to the work done previously in Finland regarding the 
characteristics of the prices lead earnings phenomenon. More specifically, in both Martikainen et al. 
(1993) and Kallunki and Martikainen (1997) the authors note that in the two consecutive sub 
periods studied the price anticipation seems to increase in the latter. If, as Kallunki and Martikainen 
(1997) state, the change in the lead-lag structure between the two sub periods 1988-1990 and 1991- 
1993 [1977-1981, 1982-1986 in Martikainen et al. (1993)] can be explained by the development of 
the infrastructure of the Finnish stock market, study using recent Finnish data should yield 
interesting results over the ability of the Finnish stock market to reflect earnings information in 
prior stock price data. During the 1990s the Finnish stock market has experienced substantial
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growth, restrictions on foreign share ownership have been abolished (1993), the accounting 
legislation has been revised twice (1992,1997) the goal being to harmonize Finnish GAAP to EU 
and IAS standards.
More importantly, unlike previous ERC studies in Finland, the empirical part of the paper will test 
hypothesis related to cross-sectional determinants that can be used to explain the quality of a firm’s 
information environment and thus the ability of its share price to predict earnings. Size measured by 
market value [Collins et al. (1987), Donnelly and Walker (1995), Donnelly (1998)] as well as the 
amount of trading in a firm’s share [Donnelly (1998)] are variables that have been tested and found 
to be significant in an international context. This study will additionally contribute to the ERC 
research field by testing for the effect of the relative amount of relationship capital to the quality of 
a firm’s information environment. Building on the findings of Seppänen (1999), it is hypothesized 
that in Finland firms which have continuously held a strong relationship with their main source of 
finance (in practice a bank) give less frequent and value-relevance public disclosure. These firms 
will consequently have a lower quality information environment and have lower ERCs when 
leading period returns are added to the dependent variable in a returns earnings regression, i.e. their 
share prices will have a lesser ability to predict earnings.
1.2 Structure of The Study
Following the introduction, I will move to cover the main developments of the capital market based 
accounting research field to date in Chapter 2. I feel that it is important for the reader to get a 
general idea of the logic behind the development and reasoning of accounting variable use in 
empirical research. Section 2.2 will deal with market efficiency and the problematic of the 
assumption of informational efficiency in relation to empirical studies in capital market based 
accounting research and obtained research findings.
Chapter 2.3 will treat the disclosure literature and concentrates in linking the amount of disclosure 
to the informational environment of an individual firm. Special attention is given to accounting 
disclosure and its features, keeping in mind that understanding the process which defines earnings 
properties has a central role in returns earnings studies. Finnish accounting legislation, its features 
and developments, are also reviewed.
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Chapter 2.4 discusses the earlier research findings concerning ERCs and lists the determinants that 
have been detected to be associated with the magnitude of the return earnings relation either using 
an association or event study methodology. In Chapter 3 the central method of including leading 
returns in the returns earnings regression to improve the magnitude of the ERC is presented. It is 
followed by the discussion of a firm’s informational environment, which effectively shapes the 
amount of information impounded into security prices prior to the official release of annual 
accounting earnings. Factors that are hypothesized to affect the amount and quality of information 
available about a firm are presented. Consequently, hypothesis tested in the empirical part of the 
study are derived.
In Chapter 4 the methodology used in the study as well as the theoretical link between earnings and 
returns are discussed. The section is intended to give a general idea of how the research field 
reasons the use of earnings as determinants for returns through a valuation model and what the 
theoretical ERC values from empirical regression given the models should be.
Data selection and the data used in the empirical part of the study is presented in Chapter 5. 
Empirical results and findings are presented in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 draws conclusions based on 
the previous chapter and its findings.
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2. THEORY AND PREVIOUS RETURNS EARNINGS RESEARCH
2.1 Capital Market Based Accounting Research - An Overview
Dumontier et al. (2002) state that the primary objective of capital market based accounting research 
(they call it “the accounting based capital market research”) has been to assess whether accounting 
data provide value-relevant information to investors, incremental to all other sources of publicly 
available information. The information content of accounting numbers is inferred from changes in 
the level or in the variability of stock prices. Argumentation in relation to accounting studies is 
usually based on the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), which states that market prices fully 
reflect all publicly available information [Fama (1970)]. In this respect it seems odd that investors 
spend considerable effort in finding mispriced stocks or that managers seek to boost stock prices by 
hiding bad news in footnotes. The EMH argues, simply put, that no matter how obscure the 
presentation of accounting information it will already be reflected in stock prices.
The actual development of the capital market based accounting research can be traced back to the 
1960s. Until the mid-1960s accounting theory was generally normative and there was little 
emphasis on the empirical validity of the underlying accounting theory’s predictions. As in 
Hendriksen (1965), the importance was laid on the development of procedures and techniques that 
best fulfil the objectives of accounting and the first steps in developing an accounting theory was 
thus to clearly define those objectives. This led to all logically consistent theories to be regarded as 
useful depending on the objectives that one defined for accounting. However, disagreement about 
the actual objectives of accounting led to no clear consensus existing over accounting policies. This 
caused scepticism towards numbers produced by accounting and the earning reported in financial 
statements. Hendriksen (1965) predicts that the income statement will see its demise if there are no 
drastic changes to the story it tells in the future.
Kothari (2001), in his extensive review of the capital markets research in accounting, lists three 
developments that facilitated the birth of capital market based accounting research and the 
important seminal papers by Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968) in the late 1960s: (i) 
positive economics theory, (ii) the efficient market hypothesis and (iii) the event study of Fama et 
al. (1969). Positive economics theory describes science as the development of a “theory” or a
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“hypothesis” that yields valid and meaningful predictions about phenomena yet to be observed. 
Therefore, as Watts and Zimmerman (1986) state, “the objective of accounting theory is to explain 
and predict”. With the efficient market hypothesis came the theoretical basis for using capital 
market values as a test of usefulness. Compared to normative accounting practices, researchers now 
had a given objective or external outcome from which to infer whether information in accounting 
reports was used by market participants and considered valid. The event study of Fama et al. (1969) 
was one of the first in its kind in financial economics and introduced the concept of relating security 
returns to different firm specific economic events such as earnings announcements. All of the above 
factors gave accounting researchers a new base to build on and the following decades have seen a 
vast number of papers devoted to capital market based accounting research.
The objective of the studies that follow Ball and Brown (1968) is usually to assess whether the 
accounting earnings determination process captures the factors that affect security prices, with the 
maintained hypothesis that capital markets are informationally efficient. In fact, early evidence 
widely led researchers to believe that the issue of market efficiency towards publicly available 
information had been resolved. Thus, it was only natural that following the 1960’s breakthrough in 
theory and methodology researchers were eager to find new ways of exploring the market based 
accounting field. Beaver (1972) suggested that the association of accounting numbers with security 
returns can be used to rank alternative accounting methods as a means of determining the 
accounting method that should become a standard. Such standard-setting approach has since been 
questioned by many academics, recently e.g. Holthausen and Watts (2001) have thoroughly covered 
the question and continue to posit that valuation literature alone should not be used to derive 
standard-setting implications in lack of better underlying descriptive theories for accounting. 
According to Holthausen and Watts (2001), just assuming that standard-setters consider a high 
association between market returns and accounting numbers a desirable feature is not enough 
justification for scientific research.
Coming into the 1980’s and 1990’s it was recognised that the early view of efficient capital markets 
from an accounting information perspective had to be questioned and researchers were mostly 
looking for new ways to explain the apparently low association between market values and 
accounting numbers. In relation to earnings the early view of constant ERCs across firms and over­
time was relaxed and studies focused on such issues as the predictability of the earnings series, 
systematic risk and the perceived noisiness of earnings series. In this respect, Kormendi and Lipe 
(1987) is an important paper and builds on the study by Miller and Rock (1985) to test whether
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time-series properties, in specific persistence, of earnings are important in explaining ERC 
magnitudes across firms. If investors consider most of the earnings innovation to be transitory it 
will not cause them to revise their future cash-flow expectations accordingly. This could be the 
result of a one-time business activity such as an asset sale. Basu (1997) stresses that because of 
information asymmetry between managers and investors there is demand and supply for 
conservative accounting numbers. Therefore, earnings are likely to reflect bad news more quickly 
than good news. In a similar tone Hayn (1995) proved that losses can been interpreted as transitory 
or negative earnings and they are not expected to continue indefinitely since shareholders have a 
put-option on the assets of the firm. Hence they will liquidate the firm rather than suffer continued 
losses and in essence losses will distort the observed returns earnings relation.
Easton and Zmijewski (1989) suggested the idea of expected rate of return being an important 
determinant of ERCs, since revisions in future cash-flows are discounted at that rate. Comparing 
earnings, cash-flows and accruals association with stock market returns was also a popular subject 
and studies in long-window context include Rayburn (1986) and Livnat and Zarowin (1990). These 
studies were motivated by the supposedly relatively crude measure of cash-flows used in the earlier 
studies and they mostly support the argument of accruals containing incremental information over 
cash-flows. Other authors tested for e.g. the significance of a firm’s life-cycle or investment 
decisions on the ERC. In general, advances were mostly made in a statistical respect as academics 
tried to improve on the low association that seemingly looked like an empirical problem since the 
returns earnings link could be quite strongly proved in theoretic terms.
Still, a popular explanation for the low observed ERCs has been capital market inefficiency. If 
markets do not interpret the information contained in earnings correctly the result will be a lower 
than expected returns earnings relation. Some of the empirical findings in the finance research field, 
such as the post-announcement drift [e.g. Foster et al. (1986) and Bernard and Thomas (1989)], 
seem to support this argument. However, as Kothari (2001) notes, unless there is a logically 
consistent inefficient market theory that predicts under reaction to earnings information such 
explanations should be tempered since overreaction is at least likely without an explanatory model.
Lev [see e.g. Lev (1989), Lev and Zarowin (1999)] has in several papers taken a strong stand for the 
deficient-GAAP argument, which states that GAAP produces low-quality earnings that exhibit little 
correlation with security returns. This is a similar standpoint to the prices leading earnings argument 
since it also lies on the low contemporaneous relationship between capital market values and
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current earnings. In general following the deficient GAAP argument posits that the quality of any 
given GAAP would be bettered by increasing the contemporaneous ERCs. As discussed earlier, e.g. 
Holthausen and Watts (2001) note that the reasons why standard setters should pursue that 
particular objective are not very well proven logically in the current research.
Barth et al. (2001), as active researchers in the value relevance field, point out that contrary to the 
opinions raised in Holthausen and Watts (2001) standard setters might find the value relevance 
literature useful. They argue that instead of offering any simplified answers to standard setting, 
value relevance literature offers “fruitful insights” into questions of interests, views that can help 
the work of standard setters. Barth et al. (2001) emphasise that e.g. the FASB in the US sees equity 
investment as a primary focus for standard setters and whether financial statements are used for 
other purposes, such as contracting, in no way diminishes the importance of value relevance 
research, hi summary they conclude that the challenge of value relevance research remains to make 
a substantive contribution in addressing questions relevant to standard setting as financial markets 
expand and become more complex.
2.1.1 The Return Window: Event Studies - Association Studies
The empirical research covering accounting earnings and stock returns can basically be divided into 
two groups: event studies and association studies. Both types of studies are common in the 
literature.
Event studies measure stock market reactions to events such as earnings announcements using a 
narrow window and try to explain whether they convey explicit information about future cash­
flows. Specifically, if the level or variability of prices changes around the event date, then the 
conclusion is that the accounting event conveys new information about the amount, timing and/or 
uncertainty of future cash flows that revised the market’s previous expectations. It follows that 
when conducting an event study a researcher expects capital markets to adjust quickly to the 
introduction of new information, i.e. the market’s are assumed to be informationally efficient. In the 
retums-eamings context event studies in practice concentrate on a few days before and after (such 
as -3, +3) the earnings announcement. One of the pros of the event study approach is the fact that 
other relevant information reflected in the security prices do not distort the results and the measured 
association between the tested variables can be attributed solely to the change in the accounting
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earnings. However, small windows result in the fact that the effect of the post-announcement drift is 
excluded. Post-eamings-announcement drift occurs when realized earnings are better (worse) than 
expected and cumulative abnormal positive (negative) returns will exist on average for a short- 
period of time. Reasons for such an anomaly could be e.g. the costs of acquiring and processing 
information or transaction costs [Ball (1992)]. In Finland, Booth, et al. (1996) find evidence of post- 
eamings-announcement drift and state that it appears to be stronger for negative than for positive 
earnings surprises. Event studies can also suffer from confounding information, which is prone to 
arrive contemporaneously with earnings announcements. Management may try to mitigate the effect 
of a poor earnings announcement by simultaneously revealing plans for expansion or strategy 
changes and this will be reflected in the security returns making the ERC not only a pure measure of 
earnings information. Also to be noted is that only some of the potential information in reported 
earnings is conveyed to the market in the month of the annual earnings announcement, and price 
changes tend to anticipate earnings changes particularly for larger firms [Collins et al. (1987)].
Association stadies test for a positive correlation between an accounting performance measure and 
stock returns over a relatively long contemporaneous period of time, e.g. one year. The assumption 
is that market agents learn about the earnings and valuation-relevant events throughout the research 
period and therefore a wider window is needed to measure the relation. The gathered information is 
used to measure whether accounting earnings are consistent with the underlying events and 
information set reflected in stock prices [Collins and Kothari (1989)]. Dumontier et al. (2002) stress 
that contrary to market reaction studies, association studies do not infer any causal connection 
between accounting figures and stock prices. They only posit that if accounting data are good 
summary measures of the events incorporated in security prices, they are value-relevant because 
their use might provide a value of the firm that is close to its market value. Similarly, Collins and 
Kothari (1989) summarize that association studies focus on whether the earnings determination 
process in a meaningful and timely way captures the valuation relevant events. The problem of this 
assumption then lies in the assumption that earnings truly are a good summary measure of value 
relevant events. It could be argued that in countries where the purpose of reported earnings numbers 
are tied to goals that would lead to them being highly different from objective summary measures of 
performance, e.g. traditionally taxation in Germany and Scandinavian countries could have a 
confounding effect, they should not correlate highly with capital market values.
The methodological approach in event and association studies is very similar, which is reflected in 
the fact that some researchers perform both event and association tests in their papers [e.g. Ball and
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Brown (1968), Collins and Kothari (1989), Schadewitz (1996)]. Therefore, most of the time e.g. 
ERC papers reporting previous findings do not elaborate on the actual research method used or the 
length of the variable measurement periods. Results concerning such observations as the main ERC 
determinants (interest rate, risk, growth) have been detected to have a similar effect in both event 
studies and association studies and the different return window measurement approaches can be 
seen as complimentary in helping to explain the returns earnings relationship.
2.2 Market Efficiency - Interpretation Of Public Information
As discussed in the previous chapter, the basis for the returns earnings research was laid with the 
introduction of the concept of efficient capital markets. In an efficient stock market this means that 
prices fully reflect immediately and in an unbiased way all relevant information entering the 
market. Keane (1985) defines efficient markets having two separate aspects, the speed and the 
quality of a price adjustment to new information. Therefore, security prices are expected to reflect 
fully and instantly all relevant information available to the market when both of these conditions are 
fulfilled. Fama’s (1970) classical division of market efficiency into three categories is very well 
known and differentiates on what type of information is regarded to be relevant when expecting that 
all prices fully reflect all relevant information:
(i) weak-form efficiency: prices fully reflect all information in prior price movements
(ii) semi strong-form efficiency: prices fully reflect all publicly available information
(iii) strong-form efficiency: prices fully reflect all relevant information in the market regardless of 
whether it is public or not
Fama (1991) later revised some of these definitions to take into account the current direction and 
advances made in research. Weak-form tests in this setting concentrate on the more general area of 
return predictability instead of how well past returns predict future returns. For example, forecasting 
returns with dividend yields or interest rates and looking for seasonalities in asset returns fall under 
the category. The semi strong-form efficiency in the new classification in defined as event-studies 
and strong-form tests are described as tests for private information.
Martikainen (1998) discusses the value of the whole set of information around investors in efficient 
markets. Following her illustration the value of an information set, V(tj) , for an investor can be 
expressed through investor-specific utility functions, through different probabilities for some new
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information to enter the market and through conditional probabilities of investors to take certain 
action when receiving the information.






= the marginal probability for investor to receive information m 
= the conditional probability of an event e, given information m 
= the utility for investor resulting from action a, given e occurs 
= the expected utility of the investor making a decision without information m
An investor will thus evaluate the surrounding information set, which can be described as a set of 
messages, and choose an action that will maximize his expected utility given the arriving message. 
Therefore, by weighing the expected utility of each optimal action by the probability of receiving 
the message, q(m), the investor knows the expected utility of the entire set of information arriving 
to the market. The utility value for each individual investor will be affected by many different 
factors like the market structure and the state of nature defining the probability of each investor to 
be able to receive information. If the market structure or the economic environment changes, 
investors’ utility functions are likely to change as well and this will affect the way they react to 
information (in the context of this paper, to earnings information). Also to be considered is the fact 
that investors’ wealth will determine the extent to which they can react to new information as they 
can only take actions within their budget constraints.
The heterogeneity of agents in the markets is therefore a function of differences in preferences, 
differences in endowments and differences in information [Kandel and Pearson (1995)]. 
Concentrating merely on the last argument, some researchers [see e.g. Kandel and Pearson (1995), 
Rubinstein (1993), Harris and Raviv (1993)] have introduced models or empirical findings in 
support of individuals interpretation differences in relation to public information. The argument in 
these papers is based on investors actually receiving the same information and sharing the same 
prior beliefs but still differing in their reaction to the incoming information. In Kandel and Pearson 
(1995), the authors present evidence on the volume-return relation around earnings announcements 
and argue that it is inconsistent with most existing models in which agents have identical
17
interpretations about public announcements. They also use data on revisions of analysts’ forecasts 
around earnings announcements to further point the inconsistency in identical interpretation.
Considering that agents in the market will differ in their beliefs as well as the possibilities and 
resources in acquiring information, the original Efficient Market Hypothesis in relation to price 
formation in the markets may be oversimplifying in practice. The work of Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980) identifies a fundamental reason for information asymmetries between market participants, 
the cost of information, and uses it to construct a price equilibrium model. If we assume that prices 
reflect perfectly all available information in the markets, those who spent resources to obtain it 
would receive no compensation. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) propose a model in which there is an 
equilibrium degree of disequilibrium: prices reflect the information of informed individuals but only 
partially, so that those who expend resources to obtain information do receive compensation. Thus 
the price system makes publicly available the information obtained by the informed investors to the 
uninformed. Other characteristics of the model include e.g.: the more individuals who are informed 
the more informative the price system, the higher the cost of information the smaller will be the 
equilibrium percentage of individuals who are informed, if the quality of the informed trader’s 
information increases the price system becomes more informative and other things being equal 
markets will be thinner under those conditions in which the percentage of individuals who are 
informed is either near zero or near unity. Most importantly, even if the Efficient Market notion is 
not entirely accurate the price system will symmetrize the information structure among investors 
and the rational expectations equilibrium will be achieved. In the rational expectations equilibrium 
all individuals have rational expectations, i.e. they understand the functional relation between the 
equilibrium price and the joint signal. So all in all it can be summarized that the more information 
which is available about an enterprise and the greater the number of traders expending resources on 
information activities, the more informative prices become [see also Grossman (1976), Verrecchia 
(1979, 1982)] because prices more efficiently aggregate and transmit diverse information held by 
heterogeneous traders.
The concept of market efficiency in a world of heterogeneous individuals therefore builds on the 
concept of market participants acting as if everyone knows the relevant information used in pricing 
securities. Beaver (1981) notes that prior research finds adjustment of security prices to reported 
earnings taking place more quickly for stocks traded in high volume. More recently e.g. Bloomfield 
(1996) and Madhavan et al. (1997) have supplied evidence for trading impounding information into 
security prices. In Bloomfield (1996), the author uses data from a laboratory setting to determine
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how trading volume helps market participants to learn from prices which then adjust as a result. 
Madhavan et al. (1997) try to answer the broad question of “Why do security prices change?” by 
studying the transaction level data of a sample of NYSE stocks in 1990. They also arrive at the 
conclusion of new public information and information learned through trading moving equity 
prices. Madhavan et al. (1997) also find evidence of systematic variation in their information 
asymmetry parameters across stocks and suggest that further research should try to define whether 
individual firm characteristics are important in explaining cross-sectional differences in price 
adjustment.
Further and deeper analysis of information efficiency in the markets and in particular the process of 
price adjustment are outside the scope of this study. There is, however, extensive accumulated 
evidence in the finance research which supports that public information is impounded into stock 
prices by trading and that this process makes the prices more informative. The former and the latter 
are important basic assumptions regarding this study as I intend to draw conclusions about the 
ability of prices to predict accounting earnings, which in turn are assumed to be a good proxy for 
the underlying set of information available, value relevant events, about an individual firm. In other 
words, the “availability” of this information set prior to the official announcement of yearly annual 
accounting earnings is measured from the prices, which are in turn assumed to be good summary 
measures of information.
2.2.1 Market Efficiency in Finland
Kallunki et al. (1997) review the accumulated empirical evidence about the Finnish stock market. 
The institutional characteristics of the Finnish markets have historically meant that like in other 
small markets clear signs of more inefficiency exists compared to more liquid trading places. This 
might be due to considerable information asymmetries between informed and uninformed traders, 
often less restrictive trading rules, and less developed institutions for investment analysis in small 
markets. Blevins and Schadewitz (1998) use interim earnings announcements of Helsinki Stock 
Exchange firms between 1986 and 1989 to show that there exists semi-strong form inefficiencies in 
HEX. Specifically, the price adjustment of share prices to unexpected interim earnings is found to 
be delayed by a statistically significant period. Studies that concentrate on the post-announcement 
drift in Finland [see e.g. Booth et al. (1996,1997), Heikkinen (2000)] have found similar evidence 
on semi-strong inefficiencies.
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Booth et al. (1997b) studied the trades executed in the HEX between the time period 1993-1995. 
They found that most of the trades in the upstairs market (prearranged trades) were executed as in- 
house trades, the same broker acting in both sides of the transaction. Trades executed in the 
downstairs market, where trades are anonymously matched in the continuous trading, tended to 
have a higher information content and a higher price impact than upstairs trades, which were 
typically executed inside the downstairs market’s inside spread. Booth et al. (1997b) therefore 
suggest that when investigating price discovery using small return intervals in HEX, a researcher 
should pay attention to the trading mechanism through which a trade has taken place. Additionally, 
they note that large trades seem to have a significantly larger permanent price effect, which 
effectively means that short term price adjustment in HSE may be distorted by the fact that the 
trading system cannot accommodate large trades without price pressure.
Kallunki et al. (1997) point out that there are several recent changes that might have or will 
probably affect the price behaviour of the Finnish stock market during the 1990s and beyond. 
Notably, the abolition of foreign ownership restrictions in 1993, the elimination of currency risk 
caused by the EMU membership (1998) and the general harmonization of accounting standards 
throughout Europe. Specifically, Kallunki et al. (1997) emphasize that the considerable increase in 
international ownership will presumably have a considerable strengthening effect on the 
relationship between Finnish and other major markets and consequently considerably change the 
behaviour of the Helsinki Stock Exchange. Vaihekoski (1997) notes that while the effect of the 
deregulation and liberalization process has had an effect on the stock market in Finland, it has also 
given room for financial innovations thus generally increasing the amount of alternative investment 
possibilities and instruments of risk management for domestic as well as foreign investors. As a 
result, the size of the financial sector has increased considerably and it has become more efficient.
2.3 Disclosure - Information Content Of Accounting Numbers
Firms communicate value relevant information to investors by providing corporate disclosure. This 
can be done in numerous ways e.g. through financial reports, management discussions, regulatory 
filings, conference calls, press releases, internet sites and a vast set of other means. Disclosure as a 
field of study is large and intriguing partly because it spans across three literatures, namely 
accounting, finance and economics. Verrecchia (2001) proposes dividing the existing disclosure 
research into three broad categories: association-based disclosure, discretionary-based disclosure 
and efficiency-based disclosure. Association-based studies are interested in the effects of exogenous
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disclosure on the aggregate or cumulative change in investors’ actions, primarily through the 
equilibrium prices and trading volume. Discretionary-based studies investigate how managers 
exercise discretion given the information they have available and efficiency-based papers try to find 
out which disclosure events are preferred in lack of prior knowledge of the information. Dye (2001) 
notes that the literature in disclosure has not yet matured enough to merit the status of a theory, 
especially in the case of accounting disclosures. Capital-market based empirical disclosure literature 
is reviewed extensively by e.g. Healy and Palepu (2001) and other papers related to the subject are 
e.g. Lambert (2001) and Dye (2001).
The most recent and relevant papers regarding my study try to characterize the link between price 
informativeness and disclosure. Fishman and Hagerty (1989) model how increased disclosure can 
lead to increased price efficiency and more efficient investment decisions. The logic behind their 
reasoning is that more efficient prices are more sensitive to the chosen investment level and 
therefore offer greater incentives to invest. Their key finding is that because of this incentive firms 
may actually have an incentive to disclose too much information and that mandatory disclosure only 
serves to aggravate the problem. Fishman and Hagerty (1989) argue that in this case, the benefits of 
additional disclosure outweigh the costs and the general public policy concern that firms on their 
own will spend less on disclosure than is socially optimal is put into an interesting light.
Lang and Lundholm (1996) investigate the association between disclosure practices, the number of 
analysts following a firm and the properties of their forecasts in the US. The informativeness of a 
firm’s disclosure policy is derived from the Report of the Financial Analysts Federation Corporate 
Income Committee (FAF Report 1985-1989), in which analysts evaluate the complete range of a 
firm’s disclosure by a score in each of the three following categories: annual published information, 
other published information and investor relation. Lang and Lundholm (1996) suggest that firms 
can attract analysts, improve the accuracy of market expectations, reduce information asymmetries 
and limit market surprises by adopting more forthcoming disclosure practices. Gelb and Zarowin 
(2002) note that while the results in Lang and Lundholm (1996) are interesting, the use of analyst 
forecast as proxy might provide evidence of firms “managing” their analyst relationships better (i.e. 
whisper numbers) rather than prices actually being more informative.
Both Fishman and Hagerty (1989) and Lang and Lundholm (1996) can be seen as studies that 
contribute to the old argument that firms essentially strive for increased disclosure to lower their 
cost of capital. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) study German firms that have switched their disclosure
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environment by moving to an international reporting regime (IAS/US GAAP) from a German one 
and thus bypass the problem of generally used US samples already having a relatively rich 
disclosure environment. Leuz and Verrechia (2000) show that a commitment to an increased level 
of disclosure will lower the information asymmetry component of the firm’s cost of capital, proxied 
by bid-ask spreads and share turnover. Specifically, they argue that a commitment to higher 
disclosure rather than a specific adopted reporting regime (IAS/US GAAP) will help the firms to 
extract economic benefits.
In Gelb and Zarowin (2002) the authors examine the association between the level of voluntary 
corporate disclosure and the informativeness of stock prices. Corporate disclosure, similarly to Lang 
and Lundholm (1996), is measured using the annual Association for Investment Management 
Research - Financial Analysts Federation (AIMR-FAF) corporate disclosure ratings. The 
informativeness of stock prices is inferred from the association between current stock returns and 
future earnings changes. More informative stock price changes contain more information about 
future earnings changes. Gelb and Zarowin (2002) find that consistent with their hypothesis greater 
disclosure is associated with greater price informativeness (i.e. higher future ERC) and therefore 
greater disclosure also provides information benefits to investors. The basic idea and research 
design in the Gelb and Zarowin (2002) study lies on the returns earnings lead-lag relation and is 
thus relevant to this paper.
Instead of covering the disclosure literature more broadly, I will move on to the specific 
characteristics of accounting disclosure and accounting earnings in particular, since they form the 
central part of this study. I believe that concerning disclosure in general and this paper it is enough 
to understand that there is a link between the amount of disclosure and the informativeness of stock 
prices and that it has been proven empirically.
2.3.1 Accounting Disclosure
In an accounting setting the central question is whether security markets behave efficiently with 
respect to accounting information. Accounting standards and practices in developed countries 
generally use the “recognition principle”, including the Revenue Realization and Expense Matching 
principles, as a basis for the financial reporting system. In essence, “accounting income” lags 
“economic income” since the latter incorporates changes in expectations of the present values of
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future cash-flows where the former incorporates such changes in accounting income gradually over 
time. Ball et al. (2000) note that this feature of accounting income arises because there is demand 
for an income variable with properties additional to timeliness. Stated differently, information 
asymmetry between managers and users creates demand for an income variable that is observable 
independently of managers. Therefore, accounting income only incorporates the subset of available 
value-relevant information that is independently observable, whereas economic income incorporates 
information that is not independent of managers, such as plans and forecasts. In other words, 
accounting income does not attempt to predict future cash-flows in the same way as economic 
income. The result is that accounting income will be a complex moving average of economic 
income. Another feature of accounting income is conservatism [Ball et al. (2000), Basu (1997)]. A 
popular example is the “lover of cost or market value” inventory rule, which incorporates inventory 
losses more quickly in income than gains. In the case of long-term assets it can effectively mean 
that increase in income is added at the point of the actual realization of the cash-flow (in the future) 
but a predicted decrease in cash-flow is incorporated into income immediately as a write-off.
In relation to accounting income, Ball et al. (2000) also find evidence that differences in demand for 
accounting income in different institutional contexts cause its properties to vary internationally. 
Their approach divides countries to those using common law, which originated in Britain and 
eventually spread to its colonies, and those using code-law (e.g. France, Germany and Japan). In 
common law countries the “shareholder” governance model is typical and the desirable properties 
of accounting income are determined primarily in the disclosure market. This leads to income 
exhibiting greater timeliness (compared to code law countries) mostly through faster recognition of 
losses. On the other hand, in code law countries the demand for accounting income is more 
influenced by the payout preferences of agents for labour, capital and government and less by the 
demand for public disclosure. The representatives of these “stakeholders” are involved in the 
corporate governance and their insider communication solves some of the information asymmetry 
between managers and “stakeholders”. For example in Finland banks were almost the only source 
of capital for firms until the late 1980’s for various reasons and thus were and still are a major 
player in corporate governance [Ihamuotila (1994)]. Although the common law vs. code law 
separation is only descriptive and both groups are not expected to be totally homogenous, it offers a 
concept of how the political, economical and social environment has helped to shape the interaction 
between economic income and accounting income in different countries.
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Similar viewpoint in respect to the information content of accounting information in different 
countries was presented in the study be Jacobson and Aaker (1993). They argued and find evidence 
for the fact that investors in the United States value short-term financial gains over long-term 
profitability compared to Japanese investors because of greater information asymmetries between 
managers and outsiders. In other words, in the US investors have less capability of credibly 
assessing the companies possibilities for long-term performance, i.e. they can not differentiate 
between bad and good managers, and this drives managers to concentrate on improving short-term 
results. Another factor that should be considered is that managers wages, bonuses and option 
programs are often tied to security prices in the US and if (as assumed) the stock market uses 
current results as indicatory of future profitability, it gives an incentive to boost earnings. In Japan, 
investors typically have closer ties to the companies and can put lesser emphases on short-term 
profits in assessing long-term gains. These investors, because of their business links, have 
considerable strategic information about the performance and plans of their associated firms. 
Jacobson and Aaker (1993) in their conclusions offer lessening the restrictions on insider trading 
and bank ownership of securities to improve the long-term focus of US firms although noting the 
potentially deleterious effects of these actions.
2.3.2 Finnish Accounting Legislation - History and Features
The Finnish GAAP have historically been somewhat different compared to common-law or even 
other code-law countries [Kettunen (1993)]. Their roots lie in the German accounting tradition of 
early 1900’s since the first researchers in the field in Finland kept close contacts to German 
scholars. The basis for the modem financial accounting practice can be seen to have been laid 
following the transition of the Finnish society from an agricultural one to a modem industrial 
society in the 1960’s and early 1970’s. The renewed financial accounting legislation (1973) and tax 
legislation were based on the theoretical ideas of Professor Matti Saario, who commenced the 
development of his ideas in his dissertation “Realization Principle and Depreciation of Fixed 
Assets” in 1945. An important feature of the new legislation was its very wide discretion given to 
managers in respect to depreciation mies, inventory mies and mies on how to divide wages between 
years, which essentially meant that companies that were growing and investing did not have to pay 
any taxes. This was essentially the case since financial accounting reports were the base of taxation 
and the Government’s intention was to spur economic growth by tying financial accounting and 
taxation close together, an approach that is still a feature of Finnish accounting practices.
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Corning into the 1980’s pressure begin to mount in Finland in relation to harmonizing the 
accounting legislation to International Accounting Standards. Globalisation of business activities 
and the harmonization in Europe set new demands on financial reporting. Accounting professionals 
argued that Finnish firms were disadvantaged in an international setting as they had to prepare a 
new set of financial reports every time they entered the international market. Kinnunen et al. (2000) 
studied the firms that published dual financial reports on the Helsinki Stock Exchange after the mid 
1980’s to determine whether the earnings produced by different standards had different value to 
domestic and foreign investors. The approach could be taken since at the time there were still 
foreign ownership restrictions1 on Finnish shares and Hietala (1989) [see also Nummelin and 
Vaihekoski (2002) for similar results] had proven that foreign investors effectively determine the 
prices of ‘unrestricted shares’ and domestic investors the prices of ‘restricted shares’. The results of 
Kinnunen et al. (2000) were that for foreign (domestic) investors IAS (Finnish GAAP) earnings had 
incremental information content over Finnish GAAP (IAS) earnings. This was further proof of 
financial information produced by Finnish GAAP differing from international practices and Finnish 
internationally orientated companies having a point in preparing dual financial reports.
During the 1980’s the Government started to shift its focus from regulating the behaviour of the 
firms to concentrating on tax income. Capital markets were also in the middle of a liberalization 
process [Booth et al. (1996)], which meant that equity investors were becoming an increasingly 
important target group for financial reporting as the bank-driven financial system was gradually 
changing. All of this meant that the introduction of a new accounting legislation in 1992 was a clear 
turning-point in Finnish financial accounting. The importance was now laid more clearly on 
informing all of the stakeholders of the firm: owners, creditors, investors and the society at large. 
As Kettunen (1993) notes, the goal was to make Finnish financial reports more comparable to those 
reported by companies in other countries by incorporating more EC legislation and ultimately 
increasing the informativeness of financial reports.
As a result of the changes made to the financial reporting and the continuing effect of European 
Union in harmonizing IAS practices, Finnish GAAP are increasingly approaching IAS. However, a
1 Foreign ownership restrictions were put in place to protect strategically important industries [Kasanen et al. (2000)], 
changes were needed in 1993 because Finland applied for EU membership
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recent survey^ by the biggest global accounting firms ranks Finland 44th among 53 developed 
countries in terms of conformity to IAS practices and notes that there are still several 
inconsistencies between national rules and IAS that could lead to differences in terms of published 
accounting information for many enterprises. Therefore, some of the differences that have branded 
the Finnish financial reporting practice internationally through the years are still likely to exist, 
notably: taxes are closely tied to earnings and opportunities for earnings management are extensive 
and visible [Schadewitz and Kanto (2002)].
2.4 Prior Returns Earnings Research: ERC Determinants
The underlying logic in studies covering return earnings regressions is that a message is said to 
convey information if it causes a change in the receiver’s probability distribution of the concerned 
random variable. Therefore, a change in the probability distribution (beliefs) will trigger an action 
and the information that attributed to the decision will be considered useful. A revision in the 
dependent variable (stock prices) would then provide evidence on the usefulness of the independent 
variable (earnings) and the greater the explanatory power of earnings to returns the greater the 
informational content of earnings would be. While ERC studies offer one viewpoint to the 
usefulness of earnings it should be noted, though, that the significance of the association between 
returns and earnings does not provide a complete measure on earnings usefulness. In various capital 
market contexts, such as corporate bankruptcy, prediction of a stocks’ systematic risk and bond 
ratings, earnings have been found to be useful [Foster (1986)].
Despite a large amount of research the explanatory power (R2) of the ERC model has been found to 
be quite weak in both the event and association study setting (under 10% in a one year 
contemporaneous regression). Lev (1989) in his extensive review of ERC research in the late 1980s 
summarized some of the factors that might contribute to the reported findings. He notes that it is 
possible that a misspecification of the model might explain the weak association between earnings 
and returns or that investor irrationality, “noise trading”, is the cause of the problems in the model. 
However, the most probable explanation is the low quality of accounting information and earnings 
in the eyes of investors. Hence, it would seem logical to concentrate on improving the quality of 
reported accounting numbers rather than on methodological issues. Especial importance should be
2 GAAP 2000: A Survey of National Accounting Rules in 53 Countries: Arthur Andersen, BDO, Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young International, Grant Thornton, KPMG and PricawaterhouseCoopers.
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given to researching the actual use of accounting information by investors and general accounting 
measurement.
Despite the apparent problems in finding a strong empirical link between returns and earnings 
researchers have continued to look for ways of bettering the explanatory power of ERC regressions. 
The following section provides insights into the most common research findings that have helped 
practitioners to understand why ERC studies might find an unexpectedly weak empirical link 
between returns and earnings even though the theoretical linkage between the two variables can be 
strongly proven (see Chapter 4 for details).
2.4.1 Economic Determinants ofERCs 
Persistence - Transitory Components
The role of earnings persistence in explaining ERCs has been acknowledged in various studies [e.g. 
Kormendi and Lipe (1987) and Easton and Zmijewski (1989)]. The logic is that while valuing 
securities investors will take into consideration that only a part of the earnings will persist in the 
long-term and use this information in forming their cash-flow expectations. Ramakrishnan and 
Thomas (1995) define that “permanent earnings shocks are those that will cause all future earnings 
to change”. Empirically speaking then the transitory part of the earnings innovation will be reflected 
in the security price only by a multiplier of 1 instead of the ERC depending on the valuation link 
(see Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion). So one of the underlying reasons for the 
economically weak returns earnings relation could be that the reported accounting earnings are not 
permanent by nature and transitory (temporary) shocks affect only the earnings of the current 
period. Several papers [e.g. Beaver et al. (1987) and Ohlson (1990)] have detected that earnings do 
include transitory components that are either value-irrelevant or have a low valuation impact. 
Perhaps the most common explanation for transitory earnings is that earnings are managed through 
discretionary accruals. This could be the result of a one-time business activity such as an asset sale. 
Basu (1997) stresses that because of information asymmetry between managers and investors there 
is a demand and supply for conservative accounting numbers. Therefore, earnings are likely to 
reflect bad news more quickly than good news. Hayn (1995) has also proved that losses can been 
interpreted as transitory or negative earnings and they are not expected to continue indefinitely 
since shareholders have a put-option on the assets of the firm. Hence they will liquidate the firm
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rather than suffer continued losses and in essence losses will distort the observed returns earnings 
relation.
In empirical returns earnings studies researchers have often relied on the assumption of earnings 
following a random walk and thus being completely permanent.3 This is because it has been proven 
that the earnings time-series can be well approximated as a random-walk and the assumption makes 
it theoretically possible to model the link between earnings and security returns through valuation 
models. This issue will be further discussed later on (Chapter 4) in the paper. However, some 
studies which effectively build on the work done by Beaver et al. (1980), Miller and Rock (1985) 
and Kormendi and Lipe (1987), try to estimate the time-series properties of each individual firm’s 
earnings and then use this information in estimating the market reaction to earnings innovations - 
the magnitude of return reactions to earnings innovations should be positively related to the 
measure of persistence. The estimation of persistence is done by assuming that earnings follow 
different ARIMA-processes, which require a historical time-series of earnings to be gathered in 
order to execute the analysis. This will effectively rule out their use in security markets with a 
relatively short history and relatively few traded shares, e.g. Donnelly (2002) requires historical 
time-series of earnings from 17 successive years in his paper. A summary of earnings persistence 
factors under different ARIMA earnings processes can be found in Collins and Kothari (1989). 
They also note some short-fallings of using ARIMA models, notably the fact that the estimates 
cannot distinguish between correlation in successive earnings numbers brought about by mere 
expansion and economic growth and that they cannot pick up trends since the ARIMA-models 
presume parameter stability. Still, the cited papers find evidence that the measure of persistence 
explains some of the return reactions to earnings innovations. Earnings persistence thus explains 
part of the cross-sectional variation in ERCs.
Risk
The size of the ERC, return reaction to earnings innovations, will depend on how investors will 
change their expectations about future cash-flows and the present value of these cash-flows will in 
turn be affected by the discount rate used in the actual process. Risk as a factor to explain the ERC 
is understood here as the systematic component of the equity cash flows’ volatility. It is also often 
called the covariance component or the non-diversifiable factor in a security’s volatility. Single- or
3 This is the case especially in association studies, event studies have increasingly used analysts’ expectations in the 
unexpected earnings component due to them becoming more easily attainable.
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multi-beta versions of the CAPM imply that the equity discount rate increases in the equity cash­
flows’ systematic risk [Fama and French (1993)]. Therefore greater risk implies a larger discount 
rate, which reduces the discounted present values of the revisions in expected future earnings 
[Easton and Zmijewski (1989)].
Most cited empirical proof of systematic risk being a determinant of the ERC include Collins and 
Kothari (1989) who use common stock betas estimated from monthly returns as a proxy for the 
riskiness of earnings.
Growth
Growth opportunities can be expected to influence ERCs. Collins and Kothari (1989) argue that this 
is since a change in earnings causes a large change in cash flow expectations if the firm has high 
growth opportunities. Various researchers have used the market-to-book (MTB) ratio to measure 
the validity of the hypothesis. The MTB ratio can be regarded as a good proxy for growth 
opportunities since the difference between market and book values of equity roughly represents the 
value of investment opportunities faced by the firm. In essence, the market is willing to pay more 
than the book value of equity for those firms that have large expected cash flows due to successful 
investments.
Fama and French (1995) found that for all NYSE firms between 1963-1992 there was a clear 
difference in the earnings streams of different company groups formed based on the MTB -ratio. As 
expected, firms with a high MTB -ratio were associated with long-term profitability and vice versa. 
Therefore, one way of interpreting the MTB -ratio could also be to consider it as a proxy for 
earnings persistence: firms with high MTB ratios are more likely to maintain their earnings and thus 
have bigger ERCs. Martikainen (1998) is an example of a paper that empirically demonstrates that 
there is an observable relationship between growth opportunities and ERCs. She uses a sample of 
NYSE firms between 1975-1990 to prove that the exclusion of loss observations increases the 
ERCs most significantly among firms that have the greatest growth opportunities. This is the case 
since the valuation impact of earnings is high in the group of firms with high growth opportunities 
and the value relevance of the excluded accounting losses is low.
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Interest Rate
One of the most obvious economic determinants of the ERC is the risk-free interest rate. In Collins 
and Kothari (1989), the authors note that the ERC is negatively related to the securities’ future 
expected discount rates. The discount rate is made up of the risk free interest rate, the markets’ risk 
premium and the firms’ CAPM beta risk. The Sharpe-Lintner model can be used as an illustration:
(3)
where E(Rit) is the expected rate of return on security i at time point t, Rft is the risk free interest 
rate, E(Rml ) is the market risk premium and ßit is the securities beta respectively. So if the risk free
rate of interests rises, then ceteris paribus the discounted present values of the revisions in 
expectations of future earnings innovations falls, inducing a negative temporal association between 
interest rate levels and ERCs. It should be noted that revisions in risk free interest rates and the 
markets’ premium will have effect on all ERCs, the only component in the discount rate that varies 
cross-sectionally is the systematic risk (beta).
The argument that the risk free interest rate is a temporal determinant of ERC magnitude ignores the 
possibility of an inflation effect. If we assume that changes in interest rates are only changes in 
expected inflation rates and that firms pass on the changes in inflation to customers in the form of 
higher prices, there will not be any relation between interest rate changes and ERCs [Kothari 
(2001)]. So basically, the negative relation between interest rates and ERC implicitly assumes either 
interest rate changes covary positively with changes in real interest rates or inflation negatively 
impacts stock prices because of unanticipated inflation’s negative effects on economic activity.
2.4.2 Other Factors Affecting The Size of The ERC
Johnson (1999) studied the effect of “normal” fluctuation in business conditions on ERCs and 
found evidence of larger ERCs in expansionary periods. She argues that because it is easier to 
capitalise on investment opportunities in expansion earnings will be more persistent during 
expansionary periods than recessions. Since earnings persistence is linked to the revisions made in 
investors’ cash-flow expectations resulting from a change in earnings, time-variation in persistence
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will lead to time-variation in ERCs. As a result, ERCs are positively related with the rate of growth 
in economic activity and the level of economic activity.
Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) demonstrate the importance of applying a contextual capital market 
analysis by claiming that the empirical relationship between returns and earnings is notably 
improved after controlling for macroeconomic variables. For example, high GNP is associated with 
affluent economy and investors might therefore expect high share returns and high ERCs. Lev and 
Thiagarajan (1993) also build a “quality of earnings” score based on the hypothesized significant 
accounting fundamentals used by investors to evaluate the persistence of a firm’s earnings stream 
and use it to evaluate ERCs and future earnings growth. Identification of value-relevant financial 
statement fundamentals is guided by analysts’ descriptions and includes such measures as a 
disproportionate increase in inventory, a disproportionate increase in accounts receivables or a 
decrease in capital expenditure and R&D.
Chaney and Jeter (1992) show that in a long-window (12-, 15- and 24-months) setting firm size is 
positively related to the magnitude of the ERC. Their interpretation of the results are that the 
broader set of information available about large firms enables market participants to interpret the 
information in financial statements more completely and to estimate more accurately future cash 
flows, leading to a decreased level of system uncertainty. The finding is consistent with earlier 
evidence by e.g. Kross and Schroder (1989) on the negative relationship between size and the 
magnitude of short-window ERCs. As investor will have less information available about smaller 
firms throughout the financial year the reaction to the actual release of annual earnings information 
will be larger because it contains more new information.
Dhaliwal and Reynolds (1994) argue that a firm’s ERC is inversely related to its default risk. Their 
reasoning is based on higher levels of default risk being associated with market’s perception of 
lower persistence in any unexpected element of earnings. By using bond ratings and leverage levels 
as surrogate measures of default risk Dhaliwal and Reynolds (1994) obtained evidence backing the 
theory in the US market. However, Kim et al. (2002) studying US industrial firms between 1984- 
1993 and using changes in debt as a proxy for changes in default risk find contradicting results to 
that predicted by the theory about the relation between the ERC magnitude and default risk. They 
attribute the surprising findings to e.g. their proxy poorly mitigating default risk, bull market during 
the research period and low R2 of the estimated regressions.
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2.4.3 ERC Determinants in Finland - Prior Research
The studies concerning the association of earnings and security returns in Finland were quite limited 
until the 1990s probably mostly due to the lack of proper research data. However, as Martikainen et 
al. (1990) note, especially in thinly traded markets financial reports might offer valuable 
information to investors because risk estimation based on historical returns is very difficult due to 
infrequent trading.
Korhonen (1975) was one of the first to study the association between earnings and security returns 
in Finland. By using weekly stock price data from the period 1960 to 1971 he reported findings 
similar to those made by Ball and Brown (1968). Additionally, Korhonen (1975) found evidence of 
the lead-lag effect in the form of information content of earnings being reflected in the stock prices 
before accounting numbers were released. The so called Arbitrage Pricing model by Ross (1976) 
was tested by Martikainen and Yli-Olli (1990) on the Finnish stock market and strong long-term 
association between stock returns and financial ratios were found.
More extensive studies on the characteristics of the ERCs on the Finnish market have been made 
since the beginning of the 1990’s. Martikainen et al. (1990) tested the effect of four different 
depreciation methods on the eamings-retums relationships between 1975-1986 arguing that 
investors should pay attention to which depreciation method they use in adjusting corporate 
earnings in order to make their portfolio decisions. The reasoning being that the characteristics of 
the Finnish accounting standards courage companies to reduce taxes by using the accelerated tax- 
based method of depreciation instead of more theoretically preferable options such as the realization 
method. However, Martikainen et al. (1990) find that the connection between the tax-based method 
of depreciation earnings (reported earnings) and stock returns were highest whilst annuity 
depreciation based earnings had the smallest explanatory power. They could not differentiate 
between the straight-line depreciation method and the realization depreciation method. The results 
could be partly explained by the fact that at the time Finnish analysts published purely tax-based 
earnings ratios in their company analyses. It could also imply that investors simply use reported 
earnings instead of adjusted earnings for some reason.
Martikainen and Ankelo (1990) studied macroeconomic effects on the association between 
corporate earnings and stock returns by using the firms listed in the Helsinki Stock Exchange in 
period 1975-1985. They found evidence of intertemporal variation of earnings coefficients and that
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a positive relation existed between market returns and ERCs. Martikainen and Ankelo (1990) also 
discovered evidence for a negative connection between earnings response coefficients and interest 
rates, a phenomena earlier cited in the US stock market by Collins and Kothari (1989). No support 
was found for GNP or inflation rates being significant intertemporal determinants of earnings 
response coefficients in the Finnish market.
Martikainen et al. (1997) found support for the evidence that presence of losses reduces the 
estimated return-earnings relation also in Finland. The earlier such findings were made by e.g. Hayn 
(1995) with US evidence. Losses were more frequent in Finland for the earnings prepared according 
to the guidelines provided by the Finnish Committee for Corporate Analysis (COC), which meant 
that unadjusted disclosed earnings resulted in a stronger association between earnings and stock 
returns.
The information content of accrual earnings, cash flows and cash dividends in the Finnish stock 
market was reviewed by Martikainen et al. (1993). They found results indicating that the market 
typically reacted to the same direction as the sign of the unexpected earnings or cash-dividends. 
Martikainen et al. (1993) also note that their results imply semi-strong form inefficiencies in the 
Finnish market, which may be a result of serious problems in risk estimation.
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3. PRICES LEADING EARNINGS - THE LEAD-LAG STRUCTURE OF ERCs
The previous section lists some of the ERC research topics that are commonly used in the literature 
to explain the nature of the relationship between returns and earnings. Next, the concept of prices 
leading earnings, central to this study, will be presented.
The low contemporaneous relation between returns and accounting earnings could be explained by 
the fact that many of the alternative sources of value-relevant information are more timely than 
accounting earnings. Remember that the properties of accounting earnings, namely timeliness and 
conservatism, arise from demands of various agents within the society and consequently will lead to 
security prices impounding a richer information set than that in the past time series of earnings. 
Consider for example a situation where a firm has made a breakthrough in product technology, gets 
tax relieves from the government or suffers a strike. Investors will accordingly make adjustments to 
their expectations about future cash-flows that will be reflected in the security market but 
accounting earnings will impound the events with a lag - depending on the accounting standards 
and in some cases the choices made by the management (accounting practices). Therefore, if the 
objective of association studies is to capture all valuation changes associated with the events 
reflected in the current period’s reported earnings measure, it may be necessary to initiate the 
cumulation of security returns prior to the beginning of the current accounting period. Figure 1 
illustrates how in empirical research the return window is stretched to include leading period returns 
and how overlapping returns are used when estimating a large pool of regressions.
Beaver et al. (1980) were the first to examine the empirical relationship between price changes and 
earnings within the context of assumptions regarding valuation and uncovered that earnings exhibit 
a lagged response to the information reflected in prices, i.e. the prior year’s return has explanatory 
power for current earnings. Hence the motivation for the use of term, the information content of 
security prices. Beaver et al. (1980) also point out the possible circularity of analysts’ earnings 
forecast evaluation with respect to ability to forecast future periods earnings if analysts themselves 





Figure 1: Example of earnings and returns measurement in lead-lag price earnings 
regressions. Return measurement interval consists of the contemporaneous and one 
leading year. Return observations are overlapping. [Kothari and Sloan (1992)]
The work of Beaver et al. (1980) was followed by several papers, which started to consider the 
effect of the prices leading earnings phenomenon in an ERC setting. For example Collins and 
Kothari (1989) point out the importance of taking into account the lead-lag structure between 
earnings and returns while researching the retums-earnings association. They find that returns 
measured over a 12-month period seriously understate the degree of association between price 
changes and earnings changes for a Compustat sample of NYSE firms between 1968-1982. A 
typical association study return cumulation period, April of year (t) to April of year (t+1), results in 
an adjusted R2 of 2,41%, while the maximum R2 of 10,94% is attained when a 15-month cumulation 
period starting from August of year (t-1) is used.
Kothari and Sloan (1992) examine ERCs for a large sample of Compustat firms between 1950-1988 
and include up to three leading year’s returns to more fully exploit the information in prices with 
respect to future earnings. The average ERC increases from 3,1 when annual, contemporaneous
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price-earnings regressions are estimated, to 6,0 when returns from the three previous years are 
included in the dependent variable. Kothari and Sloan (1992) note that this would imply capital 
markets viewing earnings changes to be largely permanent, which is consistent with the annual 
earnings’ time-series properties. They also estimate price-earnings regressions using returns and 
earnings measured over a long contemporaneous window. The approach improves the ERCs 
compared to a normal annual setting but is not as effective as including leading-period returns 
probably since returns measured over long intervals do not completely incorporate earnings 
anticipation. Similar results are obtained by Warfield and Wild (1992), who also note that the cross- 
sectional differences in accounting recognition criteria is important in explaining differences in 
explanatory power over contemporaneous regressions of earnings on returns.
Although most of the empirical studies in the field concentrate on the US market because of the 
availability of good and extensive research data there is also evidence from other countries that 
confirm the existence of the prices leading earnings phenomenon. Donnelly and Walker (1995) 
studied UK companies that had earnings and security prices available for the sample period 1972- 
1989 and found that most of the bias due to prices leading earnings is mitigated by allowing for 
prices leading earnings by one period. This result, compared to Kothari and Sloan (1992), would 
suggest that the extent to which prices lead earnings in the UK is less than that reported in the US. 
However, Donnelly and Walker (1995) do not try to specify the reason for the difference, they only 
state that in general the amount of price anticipation may be greater today than it was in the 
beginning of the sample period due to increase in both mandatory and voluntary level of disclosure. 
Donnelly and Walker (1995) also elaborate on the appropriate proxy for earnings in the regression 
considering the time-series properties of earnings. Most importantly, they find evidence that the 
improvements in ERC estimates generated by using leading returns are also associated with 
earnings persistence.
In Finland, Kallunki and Martikainen (1997) studied to what extent prices lead earnings in the 
period 1988-1993 using a regression with monthly returns and reported earnings (net profit in the 
income statement). Their methodology followed that used by Collins and Kothari (1989) and 
included the comparison of two sub periods (1988-1990, 1991-1993) to investigate the effect of a 
sever recession on the ERC magnitudes. After controlling for losses the results show that for the 
first sub period the highest explanatory power is obtained when the cumulation period of 24 months 
starting from September in year (t-1) and ending in August in year (t+1) is used and the 
corresponding holding period for years 1991-1993 is the 23-month period starting from April in
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year (t-1) and ending in February (t+1) [the R2s being approximately 32% and 34% in the periods 
respectively]. In essence, the results indicate that the extent to which prices lead earnings is 
increasing in Finland. Kallunki and Martikainen (1997) argue that this may be a result of an 
increase in the information efficiency caused by the development of the infrastructure of the Finnish 
stock market. Further evidence on the issue is needed, however.
To summarize, research evidence from the last 20 years gives support for the prices leading 
earnings theory. A key issue in empirical work, as in most other papers covering ERCs, is that there 
is no clear consensus on what methodology should be used. Fortunately this does not present a 
surmountable obstacle for prices leading earnings research since the results support the 
phenomenon under all the major methods used: see e.g. Beaver et al. (1987) for a reverse regression 
and Kothari (1992) for a comparison of “earnings change” and “earnings levels” as a proxy in a 
regression. The issue of methodology in ERC regressions when prices lead earnings is covered in 
Chapter 4.
3.1 Information Environment as a Determinant of Cross-Sectional Differences in Price 
Anticipation of Earnings
As presented in the previous chapter, empirical evidence supports prices leading earnings in capital 
markets. Donnelly (1998) emphasizes that two conditions must be fulfilled for this to happen: 
accounting recognition lags value-relevant events and the market becomes aware of these events 
before accounting earnings are released. The former condition was covered earlier in the paper and 
it was discussed that it is closely tied to features of accounting information such as timeliness and 
conservatism. The latter condition is related to the information environment of a firm, also defined 
as “corporate transparency” [Bushman et al. (2003)]. A firm’s information environment can be 
characterized as the market’s demand for and a firm’s supply of value-relevant information. In other 
words, the more information that is available about a firm and the greater the number of investors 
expending resources on information activities, the more informative prices become [Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1980), Collins et al. (1987)]. The assumption in this study is that the price anticipation of 
earnings will increase with the richness of the information set reflected in security prices [Donnelly 
(1998)]. The logic behind the assumption stems from the efficiency of the price determination 
process, which was covered in Chapter 2. I will next go through the determinants that can be 
hypothesized to be related to a firm’s information environment, and hence to cross-sectional
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differences in the lead-lag in a returns earnings regression, and will be tested in the empirical part of 
this study.
3.1.1 Firm Size
The price anticipation of earnings was defined to be determined by a firm’s information 
environment. Some previous research suggest that the amount of information available for investors 
about large firms is greater relative to that available about small firms other things being equal. 
Atiase (1985), using his differential information hypothesis [Atiase (1980)], argues that information 
production and dissemination by private parties for the purpose of identifying mispriced securities 
is an increasing function of firm size. This will lead to (i) security prices of large firms anticipating 
accounting earnings earlier that that of small firms and (ii) the cumulative abnormal returns of small 
firms exceeding those of large firms for a given level of “unexpected” earnings.
The reasoning behind the differential information hypothesis is based on the interplay between 
marginal trading profits and marginal search costs. Consider that investors could buy or sell all 
outstanding shares of a firm at the pre disclosure price and cover their positions at the predicted post 
disclosure value. Assuming costless information trading profits would then vary in strict proportion 
to the market value of the given firm. However, considering the more realistic assumption that the 
information search process is costly the marginal search costs will tend to off-set the effect of 
marginal trading profits. How to assess the marginal search costs relative to trading profits then 
becomes the key question. It can be argued that larger listed firms are generally more complex and 
that their structures and operations differ drastically from small public firms, which would increase 
search costs in tandem with size. On the other hand, certain initiation costs decrease with company 
size since large firms often supplement more extensive voluntary financial reporting, maintain 
investor relation with greater care and are frequently covered in the financial press. E.g. Bushman 
(1989) shows that analyst following is a positive function of size, affecting firms’ information 
environments. Atiase (1980) argues that post-search equilibrium prices of large firms are more 
informative than those of small firms because the marginal net profit (trading profit minus search 
cost) from private search is an increasing function of firm size.
Empirical support for Atiase’s arguments are offered in the studies by Atiase (1985) and Freeman 
(1987) for the definitions (i) and (ii) cited earlier, respectively. Collins et al. (1987) build on the
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work by Beaver et al. (1980) to investigate the information content of prices in respect to future 
earnings by partitioning firms according to size. They emphasize that their findings, similar to those 
of Atiase (1980) and Freeman (1987), have important methodological implications for studies that 
try to measure the degree of association between security returns and accounting earnings. 
Specifically, prices changes tend to lead accounting earnings particularly for large firms and 
researchers may want to start the cumulation of returns prior to the period for which the earnings 
are measured. Outside the US, Donnelly and Walker (1995) researched the amount of which firm 
size is related to price anticipation of earnings in the UK and found evidence of market value 
having a significance especially for price anticipation in the year prior to the earnings 
announcement. Donnelly (1998) obtained results of similar magnitude, although pointing out that 
more precise proxies for the information environment may produce better results.
HI: The price anticipation of earnings is positively related to firm size proxied by market 
value.
3.1.2 Trading Volume
The arguments of Atiase (1980) and Freeman (1987) covered in relation to firm size and the 
information environment of a firm can be expanded to the breath of trading in a security. It can be 
argued that the marginal benefit from acquiring additional information should increase with trading 
volume assuming search costs do not increase in tandem. The advantage of trading can be then 
more fully exploited before all privately produced information is fully reflected in security prices. 
Additionally, informed trading can also be identified more quickly in thinly traded stocks 
[Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Easley and O’Hara (1992)]. Therefore, there will be more 
information collected about firms whose shares are widely traded and there is a smaller probability 
that their securities are mispriced.
Here it is important to differentiate between two separate factors affecting the price movements of a 
firm’s security. There is a large number of papers in the finance research field that try to explain 
how e.g. large trades by informed traders are tied to spreads and depth of trading or the increase of 
uninformed traders will introduce noise and delay price adjustments [Koski and Michaely (2000)]. 
The speed of price adjustment is tied to the market microstructure and the proportion of 
informed/uninformed traders acting in the markets [Easley and O’Hara (1992), Easley and O’Hara
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(1992b)]. As it is these studies are interested in the specific price discovery process on a market, 
which can be viewed as a highly complicated process outside the scope of this paper.
The hypothesis in this paper is that the breath of trading proxy for the scope of information 
collecting activity as well as availability and hence the richness of the information environment of 
an individual firm. As well as relying on the theoretical arguments proposed by Atiase (1980) and 
Freeman (1987), the hypothesis is supported by empirical work in e.g. Bessembinder et al. (1996) 
and Mitchell and Mulherin (1994). In the latter study, the authors assess the notion that a greater 
number of news announcements maps into more information facing investors and thereby inducing 
greater trading volume and price variability. They use the number of news stories reported daily by 
Dow Jones & Company as a proxy in the empirical design and find that it is directly correlated with 
stock market activity. Bessembinder et al. (1996) build on the models by Kyle (1985), who suggests 
that information is incorporated in prices through agents’ trades. In Bessembinder et. al (1996) the 
authors, based on Ross (1989), use the absolute deviations of individual firm returns from market- 
model returns as measures of firm-specific information flows and compare it to the trading in 
individual equities as well as a “stock basket” proxied by the S&P 500 futures contract. The results 
affirm the that the expected link between company-specific information and trading volume exists 
and that the effect is particularly significant for small firms, while trading in the stock basket is 
more closely associated with their proxy for market-wide information. Although the proxy for 
information in the studies of Bessembinder et al. (1996) and Mitchell and Mulherin (1994) differs 
quite a lot the results are consistent and thus offer evidence on the phenomenon of firm-specific 
information incorporating to prices through trading. Therefore, in this study, it is assumed that the 
trading volume in an individual security is a good proxy for the amount of information entering the 
market about the company and will lead to its information environment being richer and hence the 
price better anticipating the economic performance of the firm, i.e. earnings.
H2: The price anticipation of earnings is positively related to the amount of trading volume in 
a share.
40
3.1.3. Effect of The Strength of The Bank Relationship - Shareholder vs. Stakeholder
Chapter 2 concerning accounting disclosure previously discussed the findings by Ball et al. (2000), 
which would imply that the properties of accounting income vary across countries depending on the 
legal and institutional setting. They argue that firms operating in countries belonging to the 
common-law group and relying on a shareholder corporate governance model exhibit accounting 
income values that are more timely in incorporating information (especially losses) than firms 
operating in code-law origin countries. This is because in common-law countries owners are 
“further” from the management of the firm and informing them through public disclosure and 
timely accounting income has been important in relation to efficient allocation of funds. Ball, et al. 
(2000) note, however, that poor public disclosure in code-law countries does not necessarily hamper 
the flow of information into stock prices since the information flow can instead occur through 
insider trading.
The role of banks as stakeholders in code-law countries such as Germany and Japan has been 
traditionally significant. Petersen and Rajan (1994) note that a strong banking relationship can help 
to lower the cost of capital through close and continued interaction that reduces adverse selection 
and moral hazard. In a bank centred financial system banks will also learn about different industries 
and firms through time and spread the fixed costs of monitoring and thus offer financing at low 
cost. However, Rajan (1992) notes that in concentrated banking systems relationship-specific 
informational monopolies are likely to exist. Banks are not wiling to share their company-specific 
information because as well as being able to offer financing at a lower cost they can also reap 
higher than optimal rates and thus reallocate the profit sharing between the principal and the agent. 
Additional problems are caused for the growth of innovative firms, which try to seek financing for 
rapid expansion based on future prospects as opposed to current net worth, because of lack of 
collateral [Modigliani and Perotti (2000)]. Already Myers (1977) argues that the lack of a 
developed equity market is a particularly serious disadvantage for the emergence and growth of 
innovative firms.
Finland, measured by stock market capitalisation over GNP, ranked poorly among developed 
country in the late 1980s (capitalization/GNP 0,20 for Finland compared to an average of 0,73 for 
developed countries in 1986 [Modigliani and Perotti (2000)]) while the respective statistic had 
“improved” somewhat in 1993 (0,25 and 0,54 respectively). As discussed earlier, the emergence of 
the Finnish stock market can be traced back to the liberalization process that branded the financial
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system in the late 1980s and early 1990s [Vaihekoski (1997)]. One of the most significant factors in 
the development was the establishment of the Securities Market Act in 1989, which improved 
investor rights. E.g. Modigliani and Perotti (2000) argue that the relative attractiveness of security 
versus intermediate finance is most sensitive to the quality of legal enforcement. Thus an 
inadequate legal framework impairs the development of security markets, allowing expropriation of 
small shareholders and bondholders. In Finland, the institutional financial arrangements have been 
typically described as a private, debt based system [see e.g. Ihamuotila (1994)] and banks have been 
considered to be the main source of external capital for firms. This influence was magnified by the 
fact that Finnish banks used to form so called ‘power spheres’ by cross-ownership of other banks 
and firms shares in their power sphere [Seppänen (1999)]. However, the recession of the early 
1990s, which had a severe effect on Finnish banks, has undoubtedly weakened some of the power 
they have had in the Finnish institutional setting. As a consequence, listed firms have increased the 
amount of arms-length versus bank finance in the 1990s and the general attitude towards corporate 
governance has been slowly shifting from a stakeholder view to a shareholder perspective.
Seppänen (1999), using a random sample of 42 Finnish listed firms between 1990-1992, studied the 
link between external financing related arrangements and companies general accounting disclosure 
practices in a relationship financing environment. He builds on the arguments of Healy and Palepu 
(1993, 1995), Baiman and Verrecchia (1996) and Frost (1996) who have earlier argued and found 
evidence for relationship financing arrangements to decrease management’s incentives to provide 
public voluntary disclosure of value-relevant information because of close working relations with 
their main source of external capital. However, Seppänen’s (1999) study specifically focuses on the 
link between external finance and corporate disclosure within a relationship financing setting, while 
other authors have normally concentrated on conducting inter-country comparisons between 
financial systems, e.g. the US vs. Germany. The results in Seppänen (1999) indicate that firms with 
a high degree of private debt make less frequent disclosure (i.e. forward-looking disclosures and 
timely documents of material information) and provide less timely annual earnings information. 
Also, firms which are members of a bank’s power sphere provide less frequent and timely interim 
reports.
In this study it is hypothesized that the bank relationship-specific information monopolies 
distinguished by Rajan (1992) and the lower disclosure incentives for value relevant information by 
firms with a high degree of private debt [Seppänen (1999)] will lead to differences in quality of 
firms’ information environments. Consequently, the firms that have maintained a stronger bank
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relationship in Finland during the sample period, which is measured by the amount of bank finance, 
have showed a lesser tendency to adopt improved investor information practices and can be labelled 
as still having a “stakeholder” corporate governance approach.
H3: The price anticipation of earnings is negatively related to the strength of a firm’s bank 
relationship.
3.2 Summary Table of Hypotheses
Summary Table of Hypotheses to Be Tested
Hypothesis Based on Expected Empirical Result
HI: The price 
anticipation of 
earnings is positively 
related to firm size 




Beaver et al. (1980), 
Donnelly and Walker 
(1995).
When previous years' returns are added to the 
dependent variable in a returns earnings 
regerssion using current periods' unexpected 
accounting earnings regressed on current 
period's returns the ERC increases most for 
large firms and increases the least for small 
firms.
H2: The price 
anticipation of 
earnings is positively 
related to the amount 




Bessembinder et al. 
(1996), Mitchell and 
Mulherin (1994).
When previous years' returns are added to the 
dependent variable in a returns earnings 
regerssion using current periods' unexpected 
accounting earnings regressed on current 
period's returns the ERC increases most for 
firms that have a highly traded share series and 
increases the least for firms that have an illiquid 
share series.
H3: The Price 
anticipation of 
earnings is negatively 
related to a firm's 
bank relationship.
Rajan (1992), Healy 
and Palepu (1993, 




When previous years' returns are added to the 
dependent variable in a returns earnings 
regerssion using current periods' unexpected 
accounting earnings regressed on current 
period's returns the ERC increases most for 
firms that have a low amount of relationship 
capital and increases the least for firms with a 
high amount of relationship capital.
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4. METHODOLOGY
Mapping the relationship between accounting earnings and security returns in an empirical design 
has been one of the major themes in capital market based accounting research. As discussed earlier, 
the research field is generally interested in the value relevance of accounting disclosures and often 
uses regressions of price or returns on accounting variables and uses the R2 (explanatory power) of 
the regression to denote value relevance. An important assumption imbedded in the approach is that 
an accounting amount will be value relevant, i.e. have a predicted significant relation with share 
prices, only if the amount reflects information relevant to investors in valuing the firm and is 
measured reliably enough to be reflected in share prices. As well as measuring R2 value relevance 
studies often test predictions relating to coefficients, as is the case with returns earnings research 
and the ERC [Barth et al. (2001)]. As Brown et al. (1999) note in their study on the value relevance 
of accounting numbers from the last four decades, the found R2 values have normally been low and 
in the 1990s there have been numerous studies that try to explain the weak association [see e.g. Lev 
(1989), Easton and Harris (1991), Easton et al. (1992), Hayn (1995)]. The next section will present 
the theoretical link between returns and earnings as well as the regression specification used in the 
empirical part of this study.
4.1 Regression Models - Dependent and Independent Variable
The earnings response coefficient (ERC) is the coefficient that links a change in earnings to return 
or a change in prices in a regression. The regression can generally be formulated as
R = a + ßX + s (4)
where R is the price or return over a period and X is the selected earnings component depending on 
the model used. The slope coefficient ß is called the earnings response coefficient (ERC). Normally 
capital market prices are assumed to react only to information that is not known by the market 
beforehand. This is because investors will make adjustments to valuation based on future expected 
cash flows that will be affected by the unanticipated component of earnings. This will lead to 
abnormal returns in the markets that are typically captured in an event-study context over a short 
period around the earnings announcement. The returns earnings relation can in this setting be 
formulated as follows
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CAR,, =a + ßUXk + e„ (5)
CAR being the risk-adjusted return for security i over period t, UX a measure of unexpected 
earnings and e a random disturbance term respectively, ß is the approximated ERC.
The exact fonnulation of the relation, what is used as the dependent and independent variable, will 
define the predictive power of the model and its possible econometric problems. Methodological 
papers in the research field usually agree on the fact that unexpected earnings are the appropriate 
independent variable but it is difficult to find an appropriate proxy. Researchers often use the 
change in earnings (previous year’s accounting earnings subtracted from current year’s accounting 
earnings) to proxy for unexpected earnings since it implicitly assumes that earnings follow a 
random walk, which has been proved empirically [e.g. Ball and Watts (1972) and Albrecht et al. 
(1977)], and prices do not lead earnings. Basically, if earnings change is an inappropriate proxy for 
earnings this is only because the underlying assumptions that link the earnings to prices through 
valuation are not valid, not because of a weakness in researchers logic [Kothari (1992)].
It is important to differentiate between ERC studies using the event study and the association study 
method when thinking about the unexpected earnings proxy to be used in empirical designs. In an 
event-study setting analysts’ forecasts are often used to proxy for unexpected earnings since time- 
series expectations are likely to be noisy due to the market’s access to information between earnings 
announcements. The unexpected earnings in a short span of time around the earnings announcement 
can then be measured as the difference between the actual observation and analysts’ forecast. In an 
association study ‘unexpected earnings’ can also be shown to be the best explanatory variable 
[Kothari (1992)] but such a proxy is difficult to attain. The choice of the model thus hinges on 
which proxy for unexpected earnings is less noisy rather than which should be the explanatory 
variable. Therefore, as demonstrated in detail later on in this chapter, researchers continue to use the 
absolute change in earnings or the ‘earnings level’ (the total accounting earnings of the period in 
question) as the explanatory variable for returns because their use can be reasoned through the use 
of simplified valuation models and earnings following a random walk. Using leading period returns 
in the dependent variable in association studies can be seen as a way of controlling for the apparent 
inaccuracy of the unexpected earnings proxy since the expectations of the market, and hence also 
analysts, are imbedded in the price observations of previous periods [Kothari and Sloan (1992)].
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Thus, recent research draws the conclusion that there is no clear agreement on the functional form 
of the relationship [Donnelly (2002), Kothari (2001)], and as a result studies tend to use alternative 
methods to see whether there is a difference in the predictive power of the regression models [e.g. 
Francis and Schipper (1999)]. Kothari and Zimmerman (1995) conclude that researchers usually 
have to define between price models in which stock prices are regressed on earnings per share or 
return models in which returns are regressed on an earnings variable. The price model can be 
generally formulated as
P¡ = a + ßX, + s, (6)
where P is the ex-dividend price at time t, X is earnings per share for period t, a and ß are the 
intercept and slope coefficients and e is an error term. The return model can be formulated as 
(Donnelly 2002)
P,l P,_x-\ = a + ßX,l P,_x+e, (7)
or
P,/Pt_l-l = a + ß{AX,/P_l) + 6l (8)
where the first model (7) is referred to as the ‘level’ and the latter (8) as the ‘change’ model. 
Christie (1987) shows that the models are equivalent, they yield a slope coefficient of 1/r [(1+1/r) 
when returns inclusive of dividends are used, Kothari (1992)] where r is the expected rate of return, 
when some critical assumptions are made about the nature of the earnings. In essence, for the 
models to yield the same results, earnings are expected to follow a random walk, only information 
about earnings affect stock prices and only the information in the current and past time series of 
earnings are used in setting prices, i.e. prices do not lead earnings. The details of this analogy can be 
found e.g. in Christie (1987) and Kothari and Zimmerman (1995). Based on the underlying 
similarity of the two models, Christie (1987) argues that the choice between the alternatives has to 
be guided by econometric issues or because violation of one of the underlying assumptions has a 
differential effect across different specifications. Price specifications are more likely to suffer from 
econometric problems and this is why return models are preferred [Christie (1987), Kothari and 
Zimmerman (1995)]. An example of an econometric issue in price regressions is noted in Brown et
46
al. (1999) who argue that regressing an accounting variable on price per share will subject the 
model to severe scale effects. They conclude that this may cause researchers e.g. to falsely believe 
that value relevance of accounting has increased through time.
4.2 Link to Valuation
The research interest in earnings response coefficients stems from their potential use in valuation, as 
they should theoretically provide evidence of earnings use in markets’ security pricing. Christie 
(1987) puts it simply: value is a function of expected cash-flows, which are in turn functions of 
signals emanating from accounting information. Holthausen and Watts (2001) note that in the 
valuation-literature the underlying theories are not normally specified and have to be cleaned from 
the experimental designs. This is probably the case since profound methodological treatment of the 
link between prices and earnings through a valuation specification is an extensive task and is 
normally a subject of a research paper on its own. Most importantly however, the general consensus 
among academics seems to be that the best test of usefulness for accounting information is their 
predictive power relative to security values whether it is a through a direct valuation or inputs-to- 
valuation theory. In the following I will present the basic reasoning behind the research models used 
in the empirical part of the study. For more thorough explanations and derivations of the models the 
reader should refer to the papers cited.
4.2.1 Earnings Based
Assuming [see e.g. Kormendi and Lipe (1987) and Kothari (2001)] that we use the discounted net 
cash flow model as the basis and that earnings innovations equal net cash flow innovations, an 
earnings innovation of €1 will have a present value of (1+1/r) where r is the annual risk-adjusted 
discount rate for the equity. It will be a function of the €1 innovation plus the discounted present 
value of the revision in expectations’ of all future period earnings. However, in the above case we 
assume the earnings innovation to be completely permanent and consequently the time-series 
properties of earnings will in part determine the magnitude of the relation. Thus, earnings response 
coefficients are a mapping of earnings’ time-series properties and discount rates into equity values. 
Evidence from the research literature [see e.g. Kormendi and Lipe (1987) and Easton and Zmijevski 
(1989)] implies that the ERC ranges from 1 to 3 in a contemporaneous setting. A discount rate of 
10% and permanent earnings would give reason to expect ERCs in the magnitude of 11 (=1+1/0,1). 
Also, if one assumes the price earnings multiple to give a good estimation of the ERC we should
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observe figures well above 10 depending on the industry and time-period. The model which depicts 
prices as a multiple of earnings is the one used early on in the research e.g. in the first prices lead 
earnings study by Beaver et al. (1980). There are multiple versions of the model used in the 
research depending on the specification of the independent variable. I will present the one following 
Easton and Harris (1991), which makes it simple to compare the ‘change’ and ‘level’ specifications.
If price is a multiple of earnings
Р,=рХ,+у, (9)
where P is the price of the security of firm j at time t, p is the multiplier (P/E -ratio), X the annual 
earnings per share of firm j at time t and v an error term. Beaver et al. (1980) specify that the 
multiplier imbed all the other factors that might influence price such as interest rate risk, dividend 
payout, earnings growth and accounting practices. Ohlson (1989) demonstrates that the Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) dividend irrelevance proposition requires that if a dividend is paid on security j 
at time t equation (9) must be written as
P„ + dj, = pX„ + v„ (10)
and it follows that
(AP„+dj,)l = р[ДXjJP^ + v'j, (11)
One can then see that in (11) there is a linear relation between change in earnings divided by 
beginning of period price and security returns over that period.
4.2.2. Balance Sheet Based
A significant innovation in ERC research was the paper by Easton and Harris (1991). They argued 
that the return earnings relation should be formulated based on the book value valuation model 
[Ohlson (1989)], which would effectively mean that the independent variable in the regression 
should be earnings deflated by price not earnings change deflated by price. The underlying
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reasoning was that if the book value of equity is a noisy proxy for the market value of equity and 
assuming clean surplus earnings measure the change in the market value of equity. If the balance 
sheet perspective of Easton and Harris (1991) is adopted the predicted coefficient of earnings is one, 
which would imply earnings being completely transitory. As an example [Donnelly (2002)], 
consider a €1 increase in earnings (X) if BV (book value) = MV (market value). Then, assuming no 
dividends, ДВУ = X and
P„ / P,_, = ШУ, ! MV, = X, / MV,., ( 12)
Easton and Harris (1991) show in a simplistic way how this leads to the regression model. Consider
p,=BV,,+“i, <13>
where P is the share price of firm j at time t, BV is the book value of firm t at time j and и is the 
difference between P and BV. The difference (u) between book value of equity and market price can 
result from a number of issues, most notably from conservative accounting numbers. The relation 
between the “flow” variables — accounting earnings and security returns - may be obtained by 




where X is accounting earnings per share of firm j over the time period [t-1, t] and d is dividends 
paid per share by firm j over time period [t-1, t]. Substituting (15) into (14), rearranging and 
dividing by/*,,, yields:
(APp + dJt ) / Pjt_x = Xjt / PJt_x + u"j, (16)
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So if book value and price are related, as Easton and Harris (1991) presume, earnings divided by 
beginning of period price should be an appropriate variable for explaining returns.
The similarity of the two specifications (book value based, earnings based) can be seen by dividing 
(10) by beginning of period price, which yields:
(Pj, + = AX„IPIM l + u’V (17)
and suggests that also from an earnings valuation perspective earnings levels will be associated with 
returns.
Kothari (2001) notes that while the Easton and Harris (1991) model may be useful in return 
earnings research specifications, its basic assumptions are somewhat unsatisfactory since earnings 
are highly persistent. Nevertheless, by using earnings and earnings change deflated by price Easton 
and Harris (1991), using 20 188 firm-year observations from 1969 to 1986 gathered from the 
Compustat database, obtained results which showed that the earnings ‘level’ variable was at least as 
important in explaining returns as earnings ‘change’. In addition, both were found to have 
explanatory power in a multivariate regression. This sparked researchers in the 1990s to broadly use 
earnings level deflated by price as an explanatory variable for returns in empirical papers [see e.g. 
Hayn (1995), Martikainen (1998), Francis and Schipper (1999)].
4.3 Definition of Prices Leading Earnings
Current prices have predictive power in relation to future earnings because historical cost 
accounting has a limited ability to reflect the market’s expectations for future period’s earnings, i.e. 
the information set in stock prices is richer than in the past series of earnings. This was discussed in 
Chapter 6 and empirical evidence has been provided by e.g. Beaver et al. (1980), Easton et al. 
(1992), Kothari and Sloan (1992), Kallunki and Martikainen (1997) and Donnelly (1998). The 
choice of the appropriate regression model in prices leading earnings context has been covered in 
several papers, which specifically treat the choice of the model from an empirical viewpoint 
keeping in mind the underlying valuation logic. Here, I will present the two of the most commonly 
used specifications that will be applied in the empirical part of the study. More specifically, it is 
now shown what the effect on the regression and its explanatory power will be when the prices do 
not lead earnings assumption is relaxed.
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When prices lead earnings the market’s expectation of current period earnings will differ from a 
time-series expectations. The time-series of earnings is best characterized by a random walk, as 
previously mentioned, so the unexpected earnings was in this context assumed to be the change in 
annual earnings. It follows that if prices lead earnings the market has already anticipated part of the 
change in periods t-1 and t-2 and only a portion will be a surprise in the current period. Following 
Kothari (1992) it can be shown how the prices leading earnings context leads to changes in the 
explanatory power in a returns earnings regression. If prices lead earnings by one period
X, = X,_1+x, + Lx, ■ (18)
where
x, + Lx, = AX, (19)
x, is the component of AX, that is a surprise to the market in period t (contemporaneously) whereas 
Lx, is the component of AX, that the market anticipates by the beginning of period t, and x, and 
Lx, are uncorrelated. Since information about Lx, reaches the market in period t-1, but earnings do 
not incorporate this until period t, the market-unexpected earnings are x,. The time-series surprise 
is AX, because earnings follow a random-walk. The market’s expectation of future periods’ 
earnings at time t, under the above assumptions, is
E,(X,„)=X,+Lxm for k>l (20)
This implies that the stock price, under the expectations of a perpetuity, would be
P,=(X,+Lx,+l)/r (21)
So, when prices lead earnings investors also use the anticipated component of next periods earnings 
to form the value of a security. Equation (21) is basically a transformation of (9) since r is expected 
to be constant through time, (1 / r) = p .
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4.4 Implications of Prices Leading Earnings to The Regression Models
4.4.1. Earnings Level as The Explanatory Variable
Kothari (1992) further demonstrates what the effect on the contemporaneous returns earnings 
regression and its explanatory power will be assuming prices lead earnings by one period. Consider 
the ‘level’ equation
P,IP,_x=a + ßX,IP„x+s, (22)
then
ß = [cov(X, / PM, P, / PM )] / var(2f, / PM )
= [cov {(X+ Lx,+X,)/ P,_x ,P,/PM}]
/var{(^,_, + Lx, +x,)l P(_,} (23)
Equation (23) is simplified by substituting {X,_x + Lx, ) / PM = r (see equation 21), which is a 
constant. Thus, while X, contains X,_x and Lx,, both of which are irrelevant in explaining 
contemporaneous return, Pt / P,_x, deflation by P,_, decomposes the earnings variable into a 
constant, r, and x, / PM , the component that is relevant to explaining P, / P,_,. Equation (23) reduces 
to
/? = cov(x, / P,_,, P, / P(_, ) / var(x, / PM ) (24)
By this Kothari (1992) shows that while x, and LxM together generate the period t return, only the 
component of Pt / P,_, that relates to the information in x, covaries with x, / P,_,. And because x,, 
the included variable, and LxM, the omitted variable, are mutually uncorrelated, the estimated 
coefficient is not biased. The explanatory power of the regression is
R2 = ß2 var(X, /PM )/ var(P, /PM)
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= vax(Xt/Рм)/г2 var(P, /Рм) (25)
and depends on the relative variances of x, and Lx,+1. The larger the variance of Lx,+1, the greater 
the degree of market anticipation of t+1 period’s earnings, and the lesser the surprise in period t’s 
earnings. Since var (P, / ) is generated by the sum of the information in xt and LxM, if the
variances of x, and Lx,+I are assumed equal, then the R2 in (25) will be
R2 = 0,5[var{(x, + LxM)/PM}/r2 var(P, /PM)] = 0,5 (26)
This would mean that the explanatory power of a contemporaneous return earnings regression 
would reduce to 50 percent if prices lead earnings by one period and 50 percent of the variance in 
earnings is assumed to be anticipated one period ahead. Kothari (1992) concludes that this would 
still be a high explanatory figure compared to research results [Kothari and Sloan (1992), Collins et 
al. (1994)], which suggests that returns anticipate earnings by more than one period and/or the 
results can be contributed to restrictive assumptions underlying the simple valuation model.
4.4.2. Earnings Change as The Explanatory Variable
If earnings change is used as the explanatory variable in a returns earnings regression following the 
same method [Kothari (1992)] we get
ß = [cov(A2f, / PM, P, / PM )] / var(/yf, / PM )
= cov[(Lx, + x,)/PM,P, /PM]/var[(Zx, +*,)/P,_,]
= cov(x, /P„,,P, /Pr_,)/{var(Zx, /PM) + var(x, /P,.,))} (27)
and because Lxt is known to the market during the period t-1, we substitute 
cov(Px, / P,_,, P, / Pf_j ) = 0 and make use of the assumption that Lx, / PM and x, / P,_, are mutually 
uncorrelated. If (as in the level specification before) the variances of Lx, and x, are assumed 
equal, then (27) simplifies to the approximate equality
ß * cov(x, /PM,P, ZPM)/2* var(x, /P,_,) (28)
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and E(ß) « 0,5 * (l/r). The equality is an approximation because
var(Zx, / P,_2 ) = var(x, / PM ) (29)
but the term in (17) is var(Lx,/ P,^). Since PM is affected due in part by the information in Lx,, 
var(Z,x, / P,_, ) is only approximately equal to var (Lx, / P,_2) . The difference, product of two
variances, is of second-order magnitude here. The finding is that the earnings response coefficient is 
approximately 50 percent biased in a contemporaneous returns earnings regression when prices lead 
earnings by one period. The R2 is given by
R2 = ß2 * var(A2f, /PM ) / var(P, /P„, ) (30)
= (0,25 / r2 ) * 2 var(x, / P„, ) / var(P, / P„, )
= 0,25.
Because var(x,/P,_,)/r2 var(P, ZPM) = 0,5 from (17) and (21). Thus, when prices lead earnings
Kothari (1992) shows that the R2 of the change specification is lower than that using the level 
specification.
4.4.3. Prices Leading Earnings by Multiple Periods
When prices lead earnings by more than one period we can formulate generally that
X, = X,_} + x, + Lx, + L2x, +... (31)
where x, is the component of AX, that is a surprise to the market in period t (contemporaneously),
Lx, is the component of AX, that the market learns about in period t-1, L2x, is the component of
AX, that the market learns about in period t-2 and so on. x, , Lx, , L2 x, and additional anticipation
components are assumed to be uncorrelated. Kothari (1992) shows, by using the same derivations as 
in the prices lead earnings by a single period setting, that when prices lead earnings by two periods
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and the X, / P,_, specification is used as an explanatory variable the contemporaneous R2 is only 
16,7 percent. When AX, /PM is used instead of X, /PM the explanatory variable further reduces to
about 11 percent. In short, price anticipation of earnings will dramatically reduce the association 
between returns and earnings in a normal contemporaneous association study setting. Kothari 
(1992) notes that with earnings anticipation more than two years in advance, variation in the 
expected rate of return through time, and shocks to the expected rates of return, any deviation from 
the random-walk time-series property of annual earnings and accrual manipulation will collectively 
tend to lower the explanatory power.
Donnelly and Walker (1995) build on the analysis in the papers by Kothari (1992) and Kothari and 
Sloan (1992). They find that by using different proxies for the unexpected earnings it is possible to 
differentiate between the information arriving in different time periods in the random-walk setting if 
prices are assumed to lead earnings. Detailed proof and derivations can be found in Donnelly and 
Walker (1995). Donnelly (1998), building on this proof, defines the setting in which the empirical 
analysis of prices leading earnings and its determinants can be done. Remembering that Kothari 
(1992) shows that when prices lead earnings by one period the ‘change’ variable produces biased 
estimates of the ERC but the ‘level’ produces unbiased estimates in a contemporaneous regression 
of returns on earnings. Donnelly and Walker (1995) demonstrate that the following model estimates 
unbiased ERCs provided that prices lead earnings by no more than one period
=a+ßAX,IP,_ 2 +e, “Dr­
in general it can be shown that if
(P,-P,_,)/P,_=a + fl(X,-X_)/P„+s, “Dt"
(P,-P,_t)IP,_=a + ßX,IP,.,+s, "Lt"
the D3 specification produces unbiased estimates of ERCs when prices lead earnings by two 
periods, D4 produces unbiased estimates of ERCs when prices lead earnings by three periods and so 
on. By using Kothari’s assumptions Donnelly and Walker (1995) also show that L2 produces 
unbiased ERCs when prices lead earnings by one or two periods and L2 yields an unbiased estimate 
of ERC when prices lead earnings by two or three periods. Despite the slight difference of the
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models Donnelly and Walker’s (1995) empirical findings based on a UK sample do not, however, 
support Lrbeing less biased than Dr.
The strength of the approach presented above is that the difference in ERC (AERC) measured by the 
models that include leading period prices and those that do not can be used as a measure of price 
association with current earnings that is not captured by the contemporaneous regression. Therefore, 
AERC {Dr-D\ or Lr- L\, г > 1 ) is a measure of the information, relevant for the prediction of 
the earnings for time t, contained in the price between time t-r and time t-1.
The empirical part of this study will use the Dr and Lr models to differentiate between ERCs 
approximated with different amount of leading years’ returns included in the dependent variable. It 
should be noted that total amount of accounting earnings rather than accounting earnings per share 
are used in the independent variable due to practical reasons. Consequently the deflator of the 
explanatory variable is a firm’s total market value instead of market price of its share.
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5. DATA
5.1. Sample Companies and Period
The 27 companies in the study are selected based on four main criteria: returns data has to be 
available between 1.4.1990-1.4.2002, annual earnings figures have to be available for the period 
1992-2001, the selected firm needs to have a financial year ending on the 31 December and it has to 
be continuously listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange (HEX) Main List. Financial firms (bank and 
insurance companies) are excluded because of their different accounting practices. The criteria 
listed is needed since the same sample of earnings has to be used so that ERC estimates with and
Table 1
Industry Classification & Weights for Sample and HEX Main List Firms at the End of
the Sample Period (2002)*
HEX ML Sample HEX ML (%) Sample (%) Number of Firm Years**
Banks and Finance 6 excl. 5.66 excl. 0
Insurance 1 excl. 0.94 excl. 0
Investment 7 3 6.60 11.11 27
Transport 5 2 4.72 7.41 18
Trade 4 4 3.77 14.81 36
Other services 7 2 6.60 7.41 18
Metal and Engineering 14 6 13.21 22.22 54
Forest Industry 4 2 3.77 7.41 18
Multi-Business 2 0 1.89 0.00 0
Energy 2 0 1.89 0.00 0
Food Industry 8 3 7.55 11.11 27
Construction 3 0 2.83 0.00 0
Telecomm, and electr. 26 2 24.53 7.41 18
Chemicals 3 1 2.83 3.70 9
Media and Publishing 5 0 4.72 0.00 0
Other Industries 9 2 8.49 7.41 18
Total 106 27 100.00 100.00 243
* As reported by HEX, ** each firm has 9 earnings observations from 1993 to 2001 used in the main tests.
without leading period returns can be compared. The Main List -criterion is essential since I plan to 
research the relation between the sample firms’ informational environments and the price 
anticipation of earnings. Mandatory investor communication, specified by the Rules of the Helsinki 
Securities Exchange differs between the Main List and other lists (I-list, NM-List). Most notably, 
where companies listed on the HEX Main List have to prepare interim reports for each 3 month 
period during the financial year according to the Rules of the Helsinki Stock Exchange4, the ones
4 Arvopaperipörssin ohjesääntö, downloadable at http://www.hex.com/en/rules/index.html
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listed on the NM or I-list only have to publish an interim report for the first six months according to 
the Rules of Other Public Trading5 6. There is also a general tendency to regard the firms listed on the 
Main List to have wider visibility and investor recognisance, which is often cited as a reason to 
move from the NM and I-list to the Main List when other entry criterion have been met. Therefore, 
there is reason to believe that the investor communication requirements and information 
environments are reasonably comparable only for the companies that have been continuously listed 
on the HEX Main List. A list of the sample companies can be found in Appendix 1, industry 
classification and comparison to all firms listed on the HEX Main List at the end of the sample 
period is given in Table Iй.
Table 2
Industry Classification & Weights for Sample and HEX Main List Firms at the Beginning 
(1990) and Middle (1995) of the Sample Period*
HEX ML
1990










Banks and Finance 8 excl. 10.00 excl. 6 excl. 8.96 excl.
Insurance and Invest. 16 3 20.00 11.11 8 3 11.94 11.11
Other Services 17 7 21.25 25.93 14 7 20.90 25.93
Metal and Engin. 7 4 8.75 14.81 9 5 13.43 18.52
Forest Industry 5 2 6.25 7.41 4 2 5.97 7.41
Multi-Business 12 8 15.00 29.63 8 6 11.94 22.22
Other Industries 15 3 18.75 11.11 18 4 26.87 14.81
Total 80 27 100.00 100.00 67 27 100.00 100.00
* As reported by HEX and in "Pörssiyhtiöt" booklet edition 1995 and 1990 published by Merita Investment Bank (ex-KOP) and Kauppakaari- 
Yhtymä.
Table 2 gives an idea of how the sample companies have represented a larger portion of all HEX 
Main List firms in the beginning of the sample period. The 27 selected companies presented 
33,75%, 40,30% and 25,47% of all HEX Main Listed firms in 1990, 1995 and 2002, respectively. 
In 1993, when a severe recession had had a negative impact on the Finnish economy and the 
number of new issues was low the sample companies accounted for almost half of all the HEX 
Main Listed firms (58 firms and 46,55%).
5 Muun julkisen kaupankäynnin ohjesääntö, downloadable at http://www.hex.com/en/mles/index.html
6 It should be noted that the number of listed firms and securities differs in HEX because some firms have traditionally 
had two share series issued, typically one of the share series has multiple voting rights compared to the other.
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Clearly, the are some features of the sample that should be kept in mind when interpreting the 
results. Firstly, it will automatically be prone to survivorship bias and large, more profitable firms 
will have a higher probability of figuring in the sample. Secondly, the distinct feature that has 
branded the Helsinki Stock Exchange in the latter part of the 1990s, the emergence of the 
Telecommunication sector and the Nokia cluster, will not affect the results significantly since there 
are only two companies from the sector in the sample. Thirdly, in comparison to the second point, 
stable traditional industries (Trade, Metal and Engineering, Food) will have a larger representation 
in the sample.
The beginning of the sample period was chosen based on several factors. In Finnish capital market 
history a significant change in trading procedure was the introduction of the HETI-system (Helsinki 
Stock Exchange Automated Trading and Information System), which was fully operational from
HEX & HEX Portfolio index, 1990-2002
HEX
HEX-portf.
a.\9° T>qX a>qa IS# aV°x г.\°г
Chart 1: The development of the HEX-General and the HEX-Portfolio index between 2.1.1990 (100) and 
1.4.2002
1.4.1990 onwards. Consequently the calculation of a real time HEX Main Index was started in June 
1990. The introduction of the HETI-system combined with the establishment of the Securities 
Market Act (1989) was a major step in the development of equity trade and security markets in
59
Finland especially in respect to improved investor protection7. There are also several companies in 
the sample group that entered the HEX Main List in the end of the 1980’s when equity issue 
conditions were favourable. The chosen research period allows for these firms to be included in the 
sample.
As can be seen from Chart 1 the effects of the security market boom and bust around the change of 
the millennium were also severely felt in Finland. The index data for both the HEX Main Index and 
the HEX Portfolio Index is displayed from 1.1.1990 onwards until the end of the sample period 
(1.4.2002). The index values do not represent the real values quoted by HEX and the series start 
from 100 for both the Main Index and the Portfolio Index respectively. The Portfolio Index is 
generally a better indicator of overall share performance during the sample period in relation to my 
sample group because of the high proportional weight of Nokia Oyj in the Main Index after 1997 
(3% in 1991 70% at peak in 2000).
5.2 Sample Returns
The data used in this study is mostly gathered from the databases in use at the Helsinki School of 
Economics (HSE). The return data is gathered from the HEX-database, which includes raw price
Table 3
Return on Main HEX Indexes and on Sample Firms During the Research Period in %
Year HEX-General* HEX-Portf.** HEX-25*** Sample mean Sample med.
1990-1991 -23.07 -23.15 -19.85 -25.88 -31.58
1991-1992 -29.87 -29.96 -32.31 -11.64 -12.56
1992-1993 26.89 26.28 27.08 57.04 37.00
1993-1994 67.36 66.25 112.39 88.86 90.69
1994-1995 -6.35 -17.81 -3.52 -22.00 -22.08
1995-1996 13.50 13.90 21.58 30.73 20.24
1996-1997 52.07 46.48 44.39 70.52 60.80
1997-1998 58.41 44.63 49.78 38.68 25.05
1998-1999 52.94 -5.31 7.72 -13.19 -18.73
1999-2000 137.84 58.44 95.44 25.05 12.10
2000-2001 -48.13 -42.08 -47.51 -15.23 -11.37
2001-2002 -13.25 7.41 3.21 37.18 29.97
Mean 24.03 12.09 21.53 21.68 14.96
Notes: Return cumulation for the indexes and for the firms (adjusted for dividends and capital issues) is started on the first trading day of 
April in year t and ended on the first trading day of April the following year (t+1). * Unlimited weight for any given share, ** weight of 
individual share limited to 10%, *** 25 most highly traded shares in EUR included.
7 The Development From National Capital Markets to A Global Marketplace - HEX 90 years; Särömaa Maija, Kauko 
Hanna; HEX publications 2002.
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series and daily corrected returns for each share. Returns are eventually calculated from a price 
series that is corrected for dividends, issues, splits and other capital changes individually for every 
firm. Return cumulation is started in the beginning of April in year t and continued until the 
beginning of April in (t+1) for a contemporaneous regression on the unexpected accounting 
earnings of year i and the same cumulation method is used when leading period returns are used to 
estimate ERCs (specific date is the first trading day of April). This is done to take into account the 
post-announcement drift and the consequent delay in price adjustment. Large Finnish listed firms 
normally report their audited accounts for year t during January and February of (t+1). The results 
are based on using raw returns, which is the concept applied mostly in the recent relevant literature 
[see e.g. Kothari (1992), Kallunki and Martikainen (1997), Donnelly (1998)]. Some papers in the 
research field use unexpected returns, which are calculated by applying a market index or a beta- 
estimation approach. Evidence in the literature seems to imply that using sophisticated methods of 
unexpected returns might not yield any significant benefits. These arguments are presented in detail 
in e.g. Brown and Warner (1980), Beaver et al. (1987) and Collins and Kothari (1989). In my 
sample the problem of beta estimation also arises similarly to that in Kinnunen et al. (2000) since 
most of the shares have entered the HEX Main List close to the beginning of the sample period and 
thus lack prior return history. However, I have also performed the basic returns earnings regressions 
by using market-adjusted returns (using the HEX Portfolio Index as benchmark) and the results are 
fairly similar to those obtained by using raw returns, which is coherent with past research and 
findings [see Martikainen et al. (1997) for similar results in a comparable research setting in 
Finland].
As can be seen from Table 3, the sample firms have generally fared better than the HEX-Portfolio 
Index in terms of yearly returns. However, the sign of the return for the 27 selected companies is 
always the same as that for the HEX Portfolio Index, which is not the case relative to the other 
indexes. Comparisons to the HEX General Index are bound to be unfruitful since Nokia’s 
domination is going to offer a distorted picture about the actual performance of HEX Main List 
firms. All in all, Table 3 confirms the hypothesis of more profitable firms surviving and this is most 
clearly visible in the HEX Portfolio Index return versus sample firm mean return setting.
5.3 Sample Earnings
Finnish accounting earnings have historically been less value relevant compared to numbers 
produced by other international accounting standards. This has been a result of a large possibility
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for earnings management through discretionary accruals and the special linkage between earnings 
and corporate taxation (Chapter 2). As a result, Finnish financial analyst aim to adjust published 
accounting earnings to better describe economic reality. Therefore I have initially compared two 
different earnings measures inside my sample group: accounting earnings for the financial year 
published by the company and the same earnings adjusted using the recommendations of the 
Finnish Committee for Corporate Analysis8 (COC). The COC-adjusted earnings are retrieved from 
a database provided by the Research Institute for the Finnish Economy9 (RIFE) and at use in HSE. 
Some of the firm’s lacked COC-adj usted earnings information in the RIFE database and in these 
cases the relevant information was retrieved, and the numbers calculated, from the published annual 
accounts from the Trade Register10 held by the National Board of Patents and Registration11 of 
Finland. The COC-adjusted ‘total earnings’ are viewed to be a good approximation of the true level
Table 4








1993 16.60 17.48 7.36 9.67 39.79 38.93
1994 26.73 26.61 15.81 15.89 38.48 39.36
1995 35.06 35.10 19.85 18.84 66.28 59.76
1996 29.16 29.04 24.32 23.48 41.04 39.47
1997 48.67 40.91 28.13 26.61 77.18 52.31
1998 35.16 32.42 20.02 22.07 60.91 48.39
1999 42.41 41.22 31.62 32.75 52.92 48.27
2000 58.71 59.64 27.85 28.34 90.70 93.38
2001 42.57 42.91 32.55 30.70 52.57 51.60
Notes: Includes all the 27 firms in the sample except Nokia which distorts the descriptives as an outlier. ADJEAR = COC-adjusted earnings 
for the financial year (January-December). REPEAR = reported accounting earnings for the financial year (January-December). All values 
in € millions.
of economic income and are often used when investigating the relationship between accounting 
figures and the stock market in Finland. Examples of papers using COC-adjusted earnings are 
Martikainen (1993), Martikainen et al. (1997) and Booth et. al (1997). The most significant 
adjustments concerning the COC-adjusted earnings relate to depreciation and the use of a special 
depreciation difference that can be applied in Finnish bookkeeping. The formula for calculating the 




11 Patentti- ja rekisterihallitus
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Compared to earlier studies the COC-adjusted earnings and published accounting earnings of the 
companies in my sample differ relatively little from each other. I have several explanations for this 
surprising observation in light of earlier returns earnings research in Finland. Firstly, the sample 
used in this study uses 27 companies which have been continuously listed on the Helsinki Stock 
Exchange main list between 1.4.1990-1.4.2002. Therefore, the sample is prone to survivorship bias 
and smaller and less profitable firms with more unstable earnings streams are likely to be excluded. 
Secondly, the Finnish Accounting Act was revised in a significant way in 1992 and major 
differences between IAS and Finnish accounting practices were either completely erased or 
substantially diminished. The combination of the revised accounting practices and the removal of 
restrictions on foreign shareholdings in Finland in 1993 was probably a strong incentive for larger 
companies to start targeting their financial information more internationally and the use of 
traditional visible earnings management methods has diminished as a result.
To test my hypothesis I have compared the earnings information of the sample companies in 1988- 
1992 with the descriptive statistics reported in Booth et al. (1997). Booth et al. (1997), using a 
sample of all Helsinki Stock Exchange main list companies and fiscal years 1989-1992, find that the 
mean ADJEAR (COC-adjusted earnings) figures differ significantly from zero using a t-test and a 
significance level of 5% whereas REPEAR (reported accounting earnings) figures do not. They 
attribute the difference to earnings management, which effectively means that Finnish companies 
smooth their income streams for tax purposes. Using the 27 companies in my sample I obtain 
similar results in certain respects. A t-test with a 5% significance level reveals that only the adjusted 
earnings in 1989 differ significantly from zero. However, using a paired t-test with a 5% confidence 
level to compare the means of ADJEAR and REPEAR between 1989-2001 reveals a significant 
difference between the two earnings measures only between 1989-1992. Thus, I believe that there is 
support for the hypothesis presented above as an explanation for the small difference in respect the 




6.1 Descriptive Statistics for Regression Variables
Table 5 gives descriptive statistics of the basic regression variables that are used in the empirical 
part of the study. These regression variables are reported for 1993-2002, since this is the period that 
is used when ERCs are approximated using returns with and without leading periods later on in the 
paper. Yearly mean and median returns of the sample companies in 1993-2002 are closer to the 
mean returns of the HEX Portfolio Index (19,1%) than the HEX Main Index (34,9%) in the 
respective period as expected. The mean yearly return exceeds the median return, which is due to 
some extreme observations and the results are in this respect similar to those obtained with larger 
international samples [see e.g. Kothari (1992)]. The biggest yearly gain (207%) and loss (-71%) are 
both attributed to Raisio Yhtymä OYJ in years 1996-1997 and 1999-2000 respectively. However, 
these observations are not related to extreme observations in the other variable categories.
Table 5
Descriptive Statistics for Regression Variables
Variable Mean Std.dev. Median Q1 Q3 Min. Max.
0.2673 0.5622 0.1645 -0.1278 0.5551 -0.7100 2.0700
AX, /MV,_, 0.0290 0.2066 0.0105 -0.0196 0.0528 -1.5500 1.9700
X, ! MV,_x 0.0719 0.1812 0.0785 0.0411 0.1253 -1.6800 0.9000
Notes: P is calculated inclusive of dividends and the effects of capital issues. The price is measured in the beginning of April in each sample year I 
and (t-l) respectively. MV is market value calculated on the same dates as prices. X are the published total accounting earnings in financial year t. 
Observation between the period 1993-2002 are included, N=243 for each variable.
The extreme observations in the earnings difference relative to market value category can be 
attributed solely to Julius Tallberg OYJ (-155% in 1995-1996 and 197% in 1996-1997, 
respectively). Similarly the extreme observations in the price level deflated by market value 
category can be attributed to the same company in 1995-1997. The intuition that the largest price 
movements, especially gains, are generally mostly due to the firms in the telecommunication sector 
(Nokia OYJ, Tietoenator OYJ) is confirmed by manually looking at the observations.
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6.2 Descriptive Statistics for Determinants Used to Explain Price Anticipation of Earnings 
Market Value = MVU
The market value of a company i at time t is used both in the independent variable as a deflator as 
well as an explanatory variable for the firm’s information environment and consequently the price 
anticipation of earnings. The expectation is that market value proxies for size and that there is more 
value-relevant information available for investors about large firms. Market value is measured on 
the first trading day of April in each year t by calculating [number of outstanding shares*market 
price (EUR)12]. If a company has had two outstanding share series the price for the other series is 
either the market price or, in the case of non-listed shares, it is set as the same as the price for the 
listed series. Generally, the listed more traded share series for HEX Main List firms can be 
described as a ‘В-share’, which has had poorer voting rights as the often non-listed ‘А-share’. The 
number of the more higher voting power ‘А-shares’ has been normally lower compared to the ‘B- 
shares’ (average of 43,1% for the sample companies that had two series in 1990 and 32,7% in 2001, 
respectively), which is the more widely traded series and consequently used in the return 
cumulation. The mean market value of the sample companies was € 298 501 955 on 2.4.1990, 
where as on 2.4.2002 it was € 5 291 621 608 (€ 571 053 747 excluding Nokia Oyj).
Trading Volume = ‘TV’
Trading volume is calculated from the same share series, which is used to calculate the returns for 
each company. This is always the series that has counted for most of the trading (in total EUR) if 
the company has had two outstanding series, normally the so called ‘В-share’ (see Appendix 1 for 
details). Trading volume is measured as the total volume in EUR between the first trading day of 
April in year t and (t+1). Prior to the lifting of restrictions on foreign share ownership in Finland 
(1993) firms had each share series divided into a ‘restricted share’, which was only available for 
trading to domestic investors, and an ‘unrestricted share’, which was available for trading to 
domestic and foreign investors. The legal upper bound for the portion of ‘unrestricted shares’ in a 
share series was limited to 20%. Prior to 1993 the ‘restricted share’ is therefore used for calculation 
of returns and trading volume, since it reflects the expectation of domestic investors versus Finnish 
accounting earnings [Hietala (1989)] and only the trading volume of the ‘restricted share’ will be 
coherently attributed to the price formation of the ‘restricted share’ as is done with different share
12 1 EUR = 5,94573 FIM
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series. I was only able to extract exact trading figures in EUR a day per share series from 2.1.1998 
onwards from the HEX-database. Prior to 1998 the trading volume in EUR each day is calculated as 
[number of shares traded*closing price], which induces a slight bias depending on the movements 
of the particular stock during the trading day. However, the bias is not regarded to be significant for 
the relevant use of this proxy.
The Strength of The Bank Relationship = ‘Bank RS’
The strength of the bank relationship for a given firm in the sample is calculated from the annual 
financial statements as [loans from financial institutions/total shareholders’ equity and liabilities]. It 
measures the amount of relationship capital for a given firm relative to ‘arms-length financing’. 
Even though the actual measured amount is ‘loans from financial institutions’ the item in the annual 
accounts will practically represent outstanding loans from banks. Loans from insurance institutions
Table 6
Descriptives for Determinants Explaining Price Anticipation of Earnings, 1990-2001
Market Value Trading Volume BankRS*
Mean 440 902 511 € 144 733 518 € 0.2070
Median 299 218 425 € 35 507 884 € 0.1796
Std.dev. 497 609 744 € 296 824 336 € 0.1724
Qi 85 442 494 € 6 605 565 € 0.0542
Q3 621 955 729 € 192 567 662 € 0.3152
Max. 4 620 895 380 € 2 878 868 362 € 0.6881
Min. 824 205 € 20 701 € 0.0000
N** 312 312 324
Notes: Market Value is counted on the first trading day of April in year t between 1990-2001. Trading Volume is counted between the first 
trading day of April in year t and year (t+1) in 1990-2001. Bank RS is counted as (loans from financial institutions/total shareholders’ equity 
and liabilities) at the end of year (t-1) for year t between 1990-2001. *Bank RS = The strength of the bank relationship, ** N = number of 
observations, Nokia excluded from Market Value and Trading Volume as an outlier (gives a distorted view of the determinant amounts in 
EUR).
are mostly accumulated under the ‘pension loans’ item in Finnish bookkeeping and represent 
outstanding pension liabilities. The ratio for year t is calculated from the end of year (t-1) 
statements. In Finland, the mandatory reported components in financial statements for listed 
companies are guided by the Finnish Accounting Act, Accounting Regulations, the Companies Act, 
special regulation concerning listed firms and the recommendations of the Board of Chartered 
Accountants13. Currently, loans from financial institutions are shown separately under both long- 
and short-term liabilities either in the actual balance sheet or in the notes describing the individual
13 Kirjanpitolautakunta
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components of long- and short-term liabilities. Before the revision of the Accounting Act in 1992, 
only the loans from financial institutions belonging to long-term liabilities were shown individually 
and the short term loans from financial institutions fell under ‘amortization of long-term liabilities’ 
or ‘other short-term loans’. Therefore, prior to 1992, only the loans from financial institutions under 
long-term liabilities are used in calculating the proxy because verifying the components of the 
short-term liabilities was not possible in a sufficiently reliable way. The individual rank order of 
companies based on The Strength of The Bank Relationship -ratio does not seem to differ a lot 
between 1993 and 1994, which was confirmed by finding a significant correlation. Actual data was 
collected from annual published financial statements found mostly on company websites and any 
missing statements were retrieved from the archives of the National Board of Patents and 
Registration (mostly pre-1993).
6.3 Correlation Between The Determinants
Table 7 depicts the correlation between the determinants used in explaining price anticipation of 
earnings. The Pearson correlation coefficients are significant in all three cases, displaying the fact 
that there is a linear relationship between the determinants. As could be expected, larger firms have 
larger trading volume, which is described by a very strong association between the two
Table 7
Pearson Correlation Coefficients Between the Determinants Used to Explain Price
Anticipation of Earnings in 1990-2001
Size Trading Volume Bank RS
Size 1 0.804** -0.330**
Trading Volume 1 -0.246**
Bank RS 1
Notes: Size = In (Market Value) in year t, Trading Volume = In (Trading Volume) measured in EUR between I and (t+1) and Bank RS 
is (loans from financial institutions/total shareholders' equity and liabilities) at the end of year t-1. ** Pearson correlation coefficients 
significant at the 1% level (1-tailed).
determinants. It seems that there is a negative linear relationship between a firm’s market value in a 
given year with the amount of relationship financing. The same applies for trading volume. This 
would imply that the three determinants explain the quality of a firm’s informational environment in 
a fairly similar manner and that firms which have stronger ties with banks are typically smaller than 
other sample firms. The hypothesis was that the quality of a firm’s informational environment 
would increase in tandem with size, the trading volume of its share and the amount of arms-length 
financing relative to relationship capital.
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6.4 Returns Earnings Regressions
6.4.1 Pooled Regressions 
Contemporaneous
Table 8 presents the parameters from a pooled regression for models D1 and LI, using return data 
from 1.4.1993 to 1.4.2002 and annual reported earnings data from 1993 to 2001, respectively. This 
effectively means that the parameters are estimated simultaneously for the whole sample and we do 
not allow for the ERC (/7) to vary cross-sectionally or intertemporally. The regression equation 
follows the model derived in Chapter 4 where
№ - П-,)/Pu-, =« + ßbX„ IMV,., + e, (Dl)
№ -Pu-,)!P„-, = « + №, +e„ (LI)
Table 8
Pooled Contemporaneous ERC Regressions
Dl = (/>, = a + ßAX il / + £it
LI = (A - A-,)/A -, = « + ßx>, /MV
Total Only Profit Outliers removed
Dl Ll Dl Ll Dl Ll
ERC 0.372* 0.096 0.638** 1.654** 0.704* 0.616*
Std.dev 0.174 0.200 0.218 0.373 0.290 0.334
R2 0.019 0.001 0.037 0.082 0.025 0.014
Adj.-R2 0.015 -0.003 0.033 0.078 0.020 0.010
N 243 243 222 222 235 235
Notes: ERC is the coefficient of the independent variable in a regression of the form outlined above, independent variable is either the 
difference in published accounting earnings (X) between years t and t-1 for firm i deflated by market value in t-I (Dl) or the level of earnings 
in year t for firm i deflated by market value in t-I (LI), P = stock price for firm i in year t or t-1. "Outliers removed" = extreme one percent 
small and large values of the regression variables are excluded when estimating regressions, * denotes significance at the 5% level, ** denotes 
significance at the 1% level.
and the return cumulation is always started on the first trading day of April in year t and ended in 
the beginning of April the following year t+1. The independent variable, ‘unexpected earnings’, is 
either the change in accounting earnings between years t and t-1 or the ‘level’ of accounting 
earnings in year t deflated by market value in the beginning of year t.
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The results in Table 8 show the typical problem that is associated with contemporaneous returns 
earnings regressions, notably the R2 and adjusted R2 values for the models are fairly low. The 
goodness of fit falls below 10 % even when outliers are removed and is consistent with earlier 
research. Hayn (1995) presented empirical evidence backing the statement that investors consider 
losses as transitory earnings since they are not expected to continue indefinitely due to a 
shareholder liquidation option on the assets of the firm. As a result, it has become a standard to 
control for the effect of losses on the observed ERCs in the literature. The percentage share of 
losses amongst all earnings observations in the sample firms during the period 1993-2001 was only 
8,97% (the respective figure for 1989-1992 is 28,87%). The small number of losses could be mostly 
explained by the economic growth trend that labelled the Finnish economy during the latter part of 
the 1990’s following a severe recession in 1990-1992. The exclusion of losses improves the 
predictive power of the model, as expected. Martikainen et al. (1997) report an adjusted R2 value of 
8,1% for a regression of returns on the level and change of positive annual published accounting 
earnings for Finnish listed firms in 1974-1989 and my results are similar in this respect. However, 
the ERCs obtained are considerably larger, even if a regression including both variables (first 
difference and level of earnings as independents) is used similar to Martikainen et al. (1997). The 
results are interesting because Martikainen et al. (1997) test for the effect of firm size on the 
observed ERCs and find no difference between large and small firms. Therefore, even if the sample 
in this study suffers from survivorship bias, the results indicate that Finnish accounting earnings 
could have become more useful in explaining returns in a contemporaneous setting. However, 
following Johnson (1999) and her study associating business-cycles and ERCs one could argue that 
the 1990s economic boom explains the large ERC values. The predictive power of the 
contemporaneous model for both the difference and the level specification is enhanced when 1% 
extreme outliers of the regression variables are removed from the sample. One percent outliers are 
similarly controlled for in all the ERC tests that follow.
Intertemporal variation in contemporaneous ERCs
Martikainen and Ankelo (1990) have previously proved that ERCs vary intertemporally in Finland 
(they used annual return and earnings data for the period 1975-1985) as in other developed 
countries. Intertemporal variation in ERCs can be hypothesized to be related to some of the ERC 
determinants presented in Chapter 3 having a different effect in different time periods. Such factors 
could be e.g. interest rates [Collins and Kothari (1989)], earnings persistence [Kormendi and Lipe 
(1987)] and business-cycles [Johnson (1999)]. The ERCs of this study’s sample will now be tested
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to account for intertemporal variation. Contrary to the general prices leading earnings setting, which 
requires an equal amount of earnings observation for both the contemporaneous and leading period 
tests, in this section all of the annual ERCs between the period 1.4.1990-1.4.2002 (annual earnings 
observations from 1990 to 2001) can be tested. Contemporaneous ERCs using COC-adjusted 
earnings will be safe tested as well to search for a higher explanatory power in the regression 
models.
Table 9 demonstrates how the ERC estimates vary in the sample period for pooled annual 
regressions using either the difference in earnings (Dl) or levels in earnings (LI) divided by market 
value as the independent variable. Using COC-adj usted total earnings did not result in higher ERCs
Table 9
Pooled Contemporaneous ERC Regressions in 1990-2001 and in Two Sample Sub-Periods
Dl = (P„ - P„-> ) ! П-, = « + P^X„ / MV„.t + s„
LI = (P„ - Pu- ,vn.,= a + ßX
1990-2001
Total Outliers rem.
Dl LI Dl LI
1990-1995
Total Outliers rem.
Dl LI Dl LI
1996-2001
Total Outliers rem.
Dl LI Dl LI
ERC 0.794** 0.244 1.044** 0.916** 0.847** 0.092 1.075** 0.314 0.503* 1.274** 0.791* 1.481**
Std.dev 0.089 0.142 0.234 0.231 0.103 0.177 0.302 0.252 0.214 0.342 0.382 0.414
R2 0.198 0.009 0.060 0.048 0.298 0.002 0.076 0.010 0.033 0.080 0.027 0.076
Adj.-R2 0.195 0.006 0.057 0.045 0.294 -0.005 0.070 0.004 0.027 0.074 0.020 0.070
N 324 324 312 312 162 162 157 157 162 162 158 158
Notes: ERC is the coefficient of the independent variable in an equation outlined above. Independent variable is either the difference in 
published accounting earnings (X) between years t and t-1 for firm i deflated by market value in t-1 (Dl) or the level of earnings in year t for 
firm i deflated by market value in t-1 (LI). P - stock price for firm i in year t or t-1. "Outliers rem." = extreme one percent small and large 
values of the regression variables are excluded when estimating regressions., N = number of regressions used to estimate the model, * denotes 
significance at the 5% level, **denotes significance at the 1% level.
or higher R2s during the whole sample period or the two sub-periods. The sample period was broken 
into two halves because it conveniently gives us the same amount of regressions for both sub 
periods as well as differentiating between the boom-period of late 1990s and the low stock market 
activity and recession period of the early 1990s. The results show that the two specifications for the 
independent variable perform differently in the two sub periods. Using the difference in earnings 
seems to result in a higher explanatory power and higher ERCs in 1990-1995, while the same 
applies for the level in earnings specification in 1996-2001 (excluding extreme 1% outliers). 
However, since in the prices leading earnings part of the study the studied period ranges from 1993-
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2001, these results demonstrate why the level specification seems to perform better in that setting. 
Additional tests on different time periods were run and when outliers were removed the change in 
earnings (Dl) specification resulted in the highest adjusted R2 value (20,4%) in 1990-1992. Yearly 
estimates are not reported here because of low number of observations (27).
Prices leading earnings
Next it will be tested whether we can increase the ERC in a pooled regression setting by adding 
returns to the dependent variable. Ideally, increased ERCs should provide evidence of prices 
leading earnings. Following the methodology of Donnelly and Walker (1995) the estimated 
equations are
№=а + /*(ЛX„IMV„_,) + e„ Di
(P„-Pl,-rVPl,-,=a + ß(X„l MV„_ ) + =„ Lx
Table 10
ERCs Estimated Using Leading Period Returns and Pooling the Observations
Dt = (P„ = a + ß(SXJMVu_') + su r = 2,3,4
Lt = (P„-P„-,)/Pi,-, = « + /?(*„ ! MV r = 2,3,4
Total Only Profit Outliers removed
D2 L2 D2 L2 D2 L2
ERC 1.514** 2.957** 1.808** 3.776** 1.006 2.862**
Std.dev 0.267 0.367 0.281 0.412 0.518 0.613
R2 0.118 0.212 0.159 0.276 0.016 0.086
adjR2 0.114 0.209 0.155 0.273 0.012 0.082
N 243 243 222 222 235 235
D3 L3 D3 L3 D3 L3
ERC 0.474 3.243** 1.818* 6.419** 0.123 5.279**
Std.dev 0.502 0.680 0.793 1.044 0.763 0.784
R2 0.004 0.086 0.023 0.147 0.000 0.164
adjR2 0.000 0.083 0.019 0.143 -0.004 0.160
N 243 243 222 222 233 233
D4 L4 D4 L4 D4 L4
ERC 1.331 6.413** 1.475 7.771** 0.719 5.929**
Std.dev 0.792 0.990 0.896 1.211 1.022 0.867
R2 0.012 0.148 0.012 0.158 0.002 0.167
adjR2 0.007 0.145 0.008 0.154 -0.002 0.163
N 243 243 222 222 235 235
Notes: ERC is the coefficient of the independent variable in a regression of the form outlined above, independent variable is either the 
difference in earnings between years t and (t-1) for firm i deflated by market value in year (t-2) [D2], (t-3) [D3], (t-4) [D4] or the level 
of earnings in year t deflated by market value in (t-2) [D2], (t-3) [D3], (t-4) [D4]. "Only Profit" = regression variables including 
negative earnings observations excluded, "Outliers removed" = extreme one percent small and large values of the regression variables 
are excluded when estimating regressions, N = number of regressions, * denotes significance at the 5% level, ** denotes significance at 
the 1% level. Overlapping returns are used when dependent variable uses leading year's returns.
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where т denotes the number of preceding periods for which returns are added to the dependent 
variable. E.g. L3 denotes a model where earnings level divided by market value in (t-3) is used as 
an independent variable and returns from (t-3) to t are cumulated in the dependent variable. The 
results of the regressions are reported in Table 10. As expected the ERCs increase when leading 
period returns are added to the dependent variable confirming the earlier observations that prices 
anticipate the change in earnings in year t before year t in Finland. The explanatory power of the 
models is relatively low, only the level specification for the whole sample with a year of leading 
period returns added results in an adjusted-R2 of over 20%. This is probably due to the pooling of 
the regressions, which neglects the fact that ERCs vary cross-sectionally. However, the obtained 
ERCs are highly significant in 11 of the 18 models. The earnings change model seems to under 
perform the levels specification by more than expected and does not provide statistically significant 
results when leading period returns are added to estimate ERCs.
6.4.2 Firm-Specific Regressions
The empirical evidence in the returns earnings research field indicates that ERCs vary across 
industries and firms. Therefore, to obtain a better estimate of the price anticipation of earnings the 
regressions will next be performed on a firm level rather than pooling all the regressions together. 
The equations used are
(A - p¡,-x ) / A-, = + A № / MV" )+S,
(P¡, - Py.2 ) / Py.2 = a, + A № / MVy-2 ) + *,
(Py - Py.3 ) / Py.3 = «, + A № / MVit_3 ) + s,











similarly to the previous section. The difference relative to the approach in Table 10 is that now we 
obtain a ERC denoted ( Д ) rather than (Д). Thus, the obtained ERC (Д) is a measure of firm i’s
Table 11
ERCs and Explanatory Power of Leading Period Regression Models Allowing for Cross-
Sectional Variation
Dr (P„ = X «A + £/?Л(М,» IMVil_l) + eil r = 1,2,3,4
Lr (ñ, -P»-,) IP»-r = 2>a +Xäw. 1 MV+S,, r = 1,2,3,4
Adjusted R2 Estimates
Dl LI D2 L2 D3 L3 D4 L4
Mean 0.062 0.151 0.158 0.319 -0.004 0.264 0.022 0.392
Median -0.024 0.130 0.149 0.302 -0.055 0.270 -0.054 0.409
Std.dev 0.198 0.241 0.277 0.340 0.155 0.277 0.199 0.308
Max 0.420 0.675 0.933 0.968 0.392 0.836 0.536 0.938
Min -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 -0.142 -0.130 -0.143 -0.111
ERC Estimates
Dl LI D2 L2 D3 L3 D4 L4
Mean 2.447 3.786 4.623 6.595 4.902 8.072 5.207 7.799
Median 1.489 2.829 2.791 5.057 1.497 5.286 1.376 5.886
Std.dev. 4.160 5.251 6.826 6.951 12.355 11.150 13.393 9.550
Max 15.239 20.460 27.009 26.963 60.513 53.705 67.572 43.221
Min -3.215 -3.632 -4.632 -1.217 -3.115 -0.185 -3.340 -0.654
Notes: Firm-specific regressions outlined above are used to estimate ERCs and R2 values for each individual firm and the summary results 
are reported here, ERC is the coefficient of the independent variable which is either the difference in earnings between years t and (t-1) for 
firm i deflated by market value in year (t-2) [D2], (t-3) [D3], (t-4) [D4] or the level of earnings in year t deflated by market value in (t-2) 
[D2], (t-3) [D3], (t-4) [D4].Overlapping returns are used when leading year's returns are included in the dependent variable, first year of 
earnings observation is 1993 and the last 2001, all 27 sample firms included.
returns sensitivity to its earnings and Table 11 demonstrates how allowing for cross-sectional 
variation improves the ERCs and R2s when mean and median values of firm-specific regressions are 
reported. Small sample size is effectively a factor since there are only 27 individual firms used in 
the empirical part of the study and therefore the standard deviations of both adjusted R2 estimates 
and ERCs are quite large. Even controlling for firm-specific difference does not change the fact that 
the change in earnings (Dr ) specification seems to perform very poorly among the sample. The 
goodness of fit using the level of earnings (Zr ) specification is approximately 40% for both the 
median and mean observation when leading year returns of up to four years are added to the 
dependent variable and is closer to values that one could expect to obtain [see e.g. Donnelly (1998) 
for UK companies and Kothari and Sloan (1992) for US evidence].
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Both methods used to test for the effect of including leading period returns in the dependent 
variable seem to indicate that most of the information arrives in the market inside three previous 
years of the actual announcement of reported accounting earnings for a given year. The reason for 
such an observation may be analysts’ earnings forecast window, which guides the pricing of the 
share prices in the market and could indicate the period for which forward looking firm specific 
information is ‘collected’. Piippo (2002) studied analyst flowing in Finland and covered Earnings 
per Share (EPS) forecast horizon for HEX listed firms that had at least a forecast available for year t 
in the I/B/E/S database during 1990-2000 [number of analysts observations used to derive one EPS 
forecast is not reported in Piippo (2002)]. The percentage of firms that have a t+2 EPS forecast 
available in 1990 is 3,1% while none have a forecast extending to t+3 available. In the middle of the 
period, 1995, already 59,6% of the firms have a t+2 forecast in the database while only 14,5% have 
a t+3 forecast available. In 2000, 93,2% of the firms have a forward looking EPS estimate reaching 
to period t+2 while t+3 estimates are available to 43,6% of the firms (although the amount of t+3 
estimates in 1999 was still as low as 8,6%). Therefore, during the research period of this study, 
1990-2002, analysts in Finland have tended to forecast earnings only as far as t+2 during financial 
year t. If prices imbed the information in analysts’ earnings forecast as well as other value-relevant 
information in a logical manner, we should not evidence a large increase in the ERC in a design 
using leading period returns when the return over three years prior to the earnings announcement is 
added. Thus, it would offer an explanation for the results in Table 11 as well as Table 10.
6.5 Interpretation of Observed ERCs
The ERCs approximated in sections 6.4 should be assessed against ERC values that one would 
expect to obtain by considering the underlying valuation models and investors’ expected rate of 
return on the Finnish stock market. The historical risk premium in Finland has been approximately 
the same as in other international stock markets, that is between six and seven percent14. When the 
risk premium is added to the risk-free interest rate we get the expected rate of return on equity, 
which would based on a historical expectation be around (4%+6%/7%) 10 and 11 percent. This is 
close to the mean return of the HEX-Portfolio Index during the sample period. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, the observed ERCs can be expected to be around 1+1/r, where r is the expected rate of 
return on equity, based on the underlying earnings valuation model. Therefore, based on historical
14 The Development From National Capital Markets to A Global Marketplace - HEX 90 years; Särömaa Maija, Kauko 
Hanna; HEX publications 2002.
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returns, the coefficient between earnings and returns should be approximately 10,09-11 [(1+1/0,11)-
(1+1/0,10)].
Looking at historical returns can be an inaccurate way of estimating the expected rate of return 
during the sample period. A recent survey15 demonstrates that the risk premium demanded on 
equity by investors is becoming increasingly smaller. When asked about their opinion on the risk 
premium in the Finnish stock markets, the analysts of Finnish investment banks, investment funds 
and insurance companies gave a mean answer of 6,4% in 1999 and 5,3% in 2000. Therefore, one 
could expect the ERCs to be even larger in the markets using recent data. Another reason for the 
apparent difficulty of using historical returns to predict the sample ERCs is that the sample firms do 
not represent all of the HEX Main List firms, but the sample was prone to survivorship bias.
To summarize, assessing the expected ERC magnitudes of the sample and comparing these values 
to the observed results is a complex task. As well as assessing the market’s risk premium, one 
should consider the fluctuation in the risk-free interest rate, which depending on the bench mark 
used has been below 4% for most of the 1990s. The only fairly sure deduction one can make based 
on the ERCs obtained by using either the pooling method or allowing for cross-sectional variation is 
that the ERCs are constantly below the values one could expect to obtain (maximum mean value of 
8,072 when using the level of earnings as the independent variable and allowing for cross-sectional 
variation). This is consistent with international findings [see e.g. Kothari and Sloan (1992) for US 
evidence].
6.6 Prices Leading Earnings: Effect of Determinants
Hypotheses to be tested
In the next section, the effect of the determinants outlined in the hypotheses on prices leading 
earnings is tested. The hypotheses derived in Chapter 3 were
HI: Price anticipation of earnings is positively related to firm size proxied by market value.
H2: Price anticipation of earnings is positively related to the amount of trading volume (EUR) in a 
share.
15 Osakkeiden markkmariskipreemio Suomessa; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2000.
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H3: Price anticipation of earnings is negatively related to the strength of the bank relationship.
The methodology that is used to illustrate the differences in price anticipation of earnings is based 
on Donnelly (1998). A regression of the following form is estimated to differentiate between the 
firms that are described to have the characteristics most strongly associated with price anticipation 
of earnings and the other firms in the sample relating to each hypothesis
(P„ -P»-r)IPu-r =« + /№, !MVit_t) + ßMXit /MVu_T) + eu (32)
Because we earlier established that the ‘change’ in earnings model performed poorly when leading 
period returns were added to the dependent variable the ‘level’ model is used in this section to 
illustrate cross-sectional differences in price anticipation of earnings. In equation 32 the firms that 
are included in a certain control group will be given a dummy ( A|V ) value of 1 and the rest of the
sample will be given a dummy value of 0. As a result, the coefficient ß2 will estimate the 
difference between the ERC of the firms in the control group and the other firms in the sample for 
the particular model estimated (LI, L2, L3, L4 depending on the amount of previous years’ returns 
included in the dependent variable). E.g. when testing for the effect of size, the smallest firms in the 
sample are given a dummy value of 1 and ß2 will estimate the difference between the ERC of small 
firms and other firms in the sample when leading period returns are added to the model.
To test for the effect of each determinant on price anticipation of earnings it is necessary to define 
the ‘extreme’ control group which is then compared to the rest of the sample. The small number of 
firms in the sample means that the control group can not be too extreme since this would result in a 
small number of observations to approximate the control group ERC (smallest or largest 10% 
would only include 3 firms). Consequently, the control group size is set at 25% and the firms are 
ranked each year in term of the determinant to be tested to establish which will be given a dummy 
of 1 to test for the difference in ERC. E.g. when testing for the effect of size the small firm control 
group, the firms that will be given a dummy value of 1 in equation X, will include the firms that are 
ranked numbers 21 to 27 in year t based on their market value (rank of 1 is given for the largest 
observation and 27 for the smallest). Because the control group is based on a subjective choice the 
results were also confirmed by running robustness checks using other control group sizes. Namely, 
the control group is varied by each in turn including between five and nine firms (18,5%-33,3% of
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all firms). The obtained results were similar to those run by using seven firms in the control group 
and confirm that the reported results are not subject to the choice of the magnitude of the control 
group.
In section 6.6 another approach is used to demonstrate the effect of the hypothesized determinants 
to the cross-sectional differences in price anticipation of earnings. The correlation between the 
change in ERC for each firm when leading years’ returns are added to the dependent variable and 
the absolute magnitude of the determinants hypothesized to be related to the ability of prices to lead 
earnings are measured. The strength of this approach is that we can use the natural logarithms of the 
absolute values rather than relying on a dummy approach.
Other methodologies to test for the ability of the determinants to explain variation in price 
anticipation of earnings were also explored. The idea was to find an empirical design that would be 
close to the dummy design outlined previously but would include the absolute value of size, trading 
volume and the strength of the bank relationship on the right hand side of the equation. This would 
make the results even more reliable and simpler to interpret. However, designing an equation to 
meet this purpose proved to be difficult and during the research I was unable to come up with 
logical results using alternative methods to the dummy approach. Contrary to the more typical 
studies in the finance or accounting research field which are interested in explaining the returns (left 
hand side) relating to an event or observation by a significant explanatory variable (right hand side), 
the ERC studies are characterized by an interest in the absolute value of the relation. Therefore, 
adding explanatory variables to the right hand side of the equation result in explaining the returns, 
not the actual coefficient that we are interested in an ERC setting.
6.6.1 Size
It was earlier hypothesised that investors would have more information available about large firms 
compared to small firms, i.e. large firms would have a richer information environment. Thus, share 
prices of large firms should have a better ability to anticipate earnings compared to other firms. On 
the other hand, following the same logic, the prices of small firms should anticipate earnings to a 
lesser extent than those of other firms and small firms should have smaller leading period ERCs. 
Also, small firms should have larger contemporaneous ERCs as investors leam more about their 
value relevant events closer to the release of the accounting earnings.
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The effect of size is tested by ranking the sample companies (1 is the value for the largest and 27 for 
the smallest) in terms of their market value (EUR) in the beginning of April in each year t between 
1993-2001. The companies that fall into the smallest 25% (7/27 companies) of the sample each year 
are given a dummy value ( ASit ) of 1 in the regression equation 33 and the rest are given a dummy 
value of 0. It follows that the coefficient (ß2) in equation 33 will then estimate the difference 
between the ERC of small firms and the other firms in the sample. Table 12 shows that the obtained 
ERCs support the hypothesis of small firms having smaller ERCs when leading period returns are 
added. Likewise, the contemporaneous returns seem to be higher for smaller firms than for the rest 
of the sample. Both ERCs obtained are significant in models L3
(Pit -Pit-r)'P»-r = «+A(*i ,/Щ,_г)+/МЗД,/Щ,-г)+*,, (33)
and L4, which would mean that the difference in price anticipation based on firm size is the highest 
three and four years before the earnings reported for period t. The goodness of fit of the model 
improves somewhat on the basic pooled sample, illustrating the benefits of differentiating between 
small firms and the rest of the sample. The same test as the one for the 25% small firms was also
Table 12
The Effect of Size on The ERC Estimates Using Leading Period Returns
Lt= p„.t = « + /?, (X„ /MV„_' ) + ß2AS,, (X„ / MV„_r ) + £,, r = 1,2,3,4
AS,, =1 if the market value of company i's equity capital in the beginning of April in year t is in the
smallest 25% of the sample (and 0 otherwise)
Model ßx ßi Adj.Л2
LI 0.322 0.741 0.014
L2 3.393** -1.665 0.089
L3 6.759** -3.848** 0.194
L4 7.765** -4.890** 0.207
Notes: Model LI indicates a regression which uses contemporaneous returns regressed on the level of earnings in year t, L2 indicates a 
model which uses contemporaneuos returns and one year of leading returns regressed on the level of earnings in year t, L3 and L4 are 
constructed similarly. Rankings are constructed yearly for period 1993-2001. ** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. Extreme one 
percent small and large values of the regression variables are excluded when estimating regressions. Overlapping returns are used when 
leading year's returns are included in the dependent variable. All 27 sample firms included (235 regressions).
run on the 25% largest firms to study whether the phenomenon would be as strong in the other 
extreme group. However, no strong statistical evidence was found although the sign of the dummy 
ERC was positive when leading period returns were added as could be predicted by the hypothesis.
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Another control test was run to take into account the years prior to 1993, namely 1990-1992. Some 
of the price formation information could be argued to have been “lost” by using the rankings 
starting from 1993. Therefore, a mean ranking based on size between 1990-2001 was constructed 
from the sample firms and similar test as in Table 12 was run to determine whether this method 
would better explain the price anticipation of earnings. The result from the model were worse in 
terms of explanatory power (R2) than the ones reported in Table 12.
Size: Excluding investment firms
During the estimation of the effect of size on the magnitude of the ERC when leading period returns 
are added it was detected that the three firms classified as belonging to the ‘Investment’ group 
based on industry were included in the smallest 25% of the companies during the whole sample 
period. It was essential to test whether the exclusion of these firms would have an effect on the 
results for two reasons. Firstly, it was earlier determined that allowing for cross-sectional variation 
improves the ERCs in the sample group and an overweight of a certain industry in the control group
Table 13
The Effect of Size on The ERC Estimates Using Leading Period Returns, Excluding
Investment Firms
LT= (/>,-Pu.r)IPu.t =« + /№, IMV^ + ß^S^XJMV,,_,) + £„ T = 1,2,3,4
ÅS„ =1 if the market value of company i's equity capital in the beginning of April in year t is in the
smallest 25% of the sample (and 0 otherwise)
Model /?, Pi Adj.Я2
LI 1.182* 0.757 0.054
L2 3.769** -0.563 0.089
L3 6.609** -1.139 0.177
L4 9.226** -2.632 0.222
Notes: Model LI indicates a regression which uses contemporaneous returns regressed on the level of earnings in year t, L2 indicates a 
model which uses contemporaneuos returns and one year of leading returns regressed on the level of earnings in year t, L3 and L4 are 
constructed similarly. Rankings are constructed yearly for period 1993-2001. * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, ** denotes 
statistical significance at the 1% level. Extreme one percent small and large values of the regression variables are excluded when estimating 
regressions. Overlapping returns are used when leading year's returns are included in the dependent variable. 24 sample firms included 
(investent firms excluded, 216 regressions).
could bias the results. Secondly, the investment firms in question are mostly companies that invest 
in property and they have been forced to perform write-downs during the first half of the 1990’s and 
to frequently report losses which could dampen the ERCs (Hayn 1995). Thirdly, Kasanen and 
Puttonen (1994), when studying investor relations of Finnish listed companies in 1994 using a
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questionnaire sent to members of the Finnish Analyst Association, strongly criticized the investor 
relations of real estate investment firms in terms of quantity, reliability and clearness of 
communication. All of the factors are likely to explain some of the perceived “low quality” 
information environment of firms categorized as belonging to the Investment group by industry.
Table 13 depicts the results obtained by using a sample of 24 companies, excluding investment 
firms, and taking the ones that are included in the smallest 25% (6/24) of the sample by a yearly 
ranking. The results are qualitatively similar as in the test including all of the 27 sample firms. 
However, the ß2 values are not significant which could be a sign of the investment firms biasing the 
results when the whole set of sample companies are used.
6.6.2 Trading Volume
The second hypothesis to be tested in relation to price anticipation of earnings is the effect of 
trading volume. Prior evidence in the literature and intuition suggests that the richness of a firm’s 
information environment could be linked to the amount of shares traded, large trading volume 
would consequently lead to a more efficient pricing process. Firms registering a high trading 
volume for their share series would then have a larger ERC when leading period returns are added 
and firms with low trading volume would have larger contemporaneous ERCs.
Table 14
The Effect of Trading Volume on The ERC Estimates Using Leading Period Returns
Lt= (P„ - P„.T)I Pu.t = a + ß,(Xu / MVu_r) + ß^T^X,, I MVa_T) + s„ г = 1,2,3,4
A7„ =1 if the company is ranked in the smallest 25% of the sample in terms of trading volume (EUR) in
year [t,(t+l)1 in relation to its more widely traded share series (and 0 otherwise)
Model Рг Adj. 7?2
LI 0.300 0.823 0.015
L2 3.404** -1.807 0.090
L3 6.754** -3.960** 0.193
L4 7.083** -3.831** 0.186
Notes: Model LI indicates a regression which uses contemporaneous returns regressed on the level of earnings in year t, L2 indicates a 
model which uses contemporaneuos returns and one year of leading returns regressed on the level of earnings in year t, L3 and L4 are 
constructed similarly. Rankings are constructed yearly for period 1993-2001. ** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. Extreme one 
percent small and large values of the regression variables are excluded when estimating regressions. Overlapping returns are used when 
leading year’s returns are included in the dependent variable. All 27 sample firms included (235 regressions).
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The effect of trading volume on the ability of prices to lead earnings is tested with similar 
methodology as that for size earlier. The sample firms are ranked in the beginning of April in each 
year from 1993 until 2001 according to their trading volume in EUR in the particular year [t, (t+1)]. 
E.g. for 1995 the ranking is based on the volume of trade (EUR) in the share series used in the 
return calculation between 1.4.1995 and 1.4.1996. This is effectively the same time period over 
which the contemporaneous ERC is measured (e.g. LI). The firms which are ranked in the smallest 
25% of the sample based on trading volume in EUR are given a dummy ( XTU ) of 1 in equation 34 
and the rest of the sample firms are given a dummy of 0.
« - P„-, ) IP,,-, = «+A (X, > MV,,-, )+/W № / MV„_, )+s, (34)
The results obtained can be seen in Table 14. Again the sign of the ERCs measured are coherent 
with the expectations of trading volume explaining the richness of a firm’s information 
environment, i.e. ß2 is positive for the contemporaneous model but negative for the models which 
include leading period returns. The price anticipation of earnings seems to be statistically 
significantly weak three and four years prior to the announcement of earnings in year t for shares 
that are thinly traded in terms of total EUR. The goodness of fit (R2) is fairly similar to that obtained 
when size was used as a determinant to measure its effect on the price anticipation of earnings. A 
control test was run to determine whether there was a similar effect on the ERC using the 25% of 
firms with the highest trading volume in terms of EUR each year but no statistically significant 
results were obtained. A second control test was run by using the mean ranking of firms between 
1990-2001 using total trading volume in EUR but the results were worse in terms of the explanatory 
power of the model (R2).
Trading volume: Excluding investment firms
As with the estimation of size a large part of the regressions (67% of all “Investment” firm 
observations) attributed to the “Investment” firms based on the industry classification were included 
in the control group of 25% smallest companies in terms of total trading volume in EUR. Therefore, 
similarly to the case of size, it was tested whether the results would materially differ by excluding 
the “Investment” firms from the sample and re-running the tests with the remaining 24 firms (6/24 
in the control group). As can be seen from Table 15, the results of excluding the “Investment” firms
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from the estimation model results in qualitatively similar ERCs as the one for the whole sample. 
The (ß2) values for models L3 and L4 are statistically significant at the 5% level which could 
imply that trading volume is a stronger determinant for explaining price anticipation of earnings 
than market value. The goodness of fit (R2) also improves over the initial model including all the 
sample firms, notably for the contemporaneous model and for the model including three years of 
leading returns.
Table 15
The Effect of Trading Volume on the ERC Estimates Using Leading Period Returns,
Excluding Investment Firms
Lt= {Pu - P„.r )//>„_, =« + /?,(*„ ! MV и_т) + ргХТ„(Хи / MVu_t) + e„ r = !>2’3>4
ÅT„ = 1 if the company is ranked in the smallest 25% of the sample in terms of trading volume (EUR) in 
year [t,(t+l)l in relation to its more widely traded share series (and 0 otherwise)
Model A Pi Adj./?2
LI 1.381** 0.231 0.049
L2 3.955** -1.207 0.092
L3 7.125** -3.209* 0.192
L4 9.315** -4.275* 0.232
Notes: Model LI indicates a regression which uses contemporaneous returns regressed on the level of earnings in year t, L2 indicates a 
model which uses contemporaneuos returns and one year of leading returns regressed on the level of earnings in year t, L3 and L4 are 
constructed similarly. Rankings are constructed yearly for period 1993-2001. * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, ** denotes 
statistical significance at the 1% level. Extreme one percent small and large values of the regression variables are excluded when estimating 
regressions. Overlapping returns are used when leading year's returns are included in the dependent variable. 24 sample firms included 
(investent firms excluded, 216 regressions).
6.6.3 The Strength of The Bank Relationship
Based on e.g. Seppänen (1999), it was earlier hypothesised that in Finland the firms with a higher 
portion of relationship financing relative to assets will have lower incentives to provide timely 
value-relevant public disclosure because of their close working relations with the main source of 
capital. In a prices leading earnings setting this should mean that firms with a higher portion of bank 
debt would have a higher contemporaneous ERC and lower ERCs when leading period returns are 
added. Sample firms are ranked by using the Bank RS proxy (loans from financial institutions/total 
shareholders’ equity and liabilities) at the end of each year (t-1) and the highest or lowest 25% of 
the observations in are given a dummy of 1 ( ÅBit ) in year t and the rest 0 in the following equation
(35)
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(Pu - Pu-r ) / Pu-r= « + Л (Хы 1 MV«-r ) + /W, (X» ' MV«-r ) + £u (35)
Table 16 shows that the association is of the same sign as expected for firms that can be 
characterised as having a strong bank relationship, i.e. prices do not seem to anticipate earnings as 
well for these firms as for the rest of the sample. The (ß2) values are highly significant when 
leading period return cumulation is started two or three years before the release of the actual 
accounting earnings. The same test was run by giving the sample companies an average rank based 
on their individual rankings between 1989-2000, but the results were very similar to those in Table 
16 and thus not reported here.
Table 16
The Effect of the Strength of the Bank Relationship on ERC Estimates Using Leading
Period Returns (strong ties)
Lt = (P„ - Pu.r)//>,_,= « + A(*„ /MVu_r) + /?2 AB„{X„ /MVu„t) + еи т = 1,2,3,4
ЛВ„ = 1 if the company is ranked in the highest 25% of the sample in terms of (loans from financial 
institutions/total shareholders' equity and liabilities) at the end of year t-1
Model P, Pi Adj Я2
LI 0.519 0.227 0.007
L2 3.249** -1.304 0.084
L3 7.032** -4.157** 0.197
L4 7.651** -5.186** 0.207
Notes: Model LI indicates a regression which uses contemporaneous returns regressed on the level of earnings in year t, L2 indicates a 
model which uses contemporaneuos returns and one year of leading returns regressed on the level of earnings in year t, L3 and L4 are 
constructed similarly. Rankings are constructed yearly for period 1993-2001. ** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. Extreme one 
percent small and large values of the regression variables are excluded when estimating regressions. Overlapping returns are used when 
leading year's returns are included in the dependent variable. All 27 sample firms included (235 regressions).
Contrary to size and trading volume, the Bank RS proxy seems to have high explanatory power also 
in the other extreme group. Table 17 shows how changing the dummy to include the 25% of the 
firms that had the lowest amount of loans from financial institutions each year have significantly 
higher ERCs when leading period returns are added to the dependent variable. Therefore, based on 
the results, firms’ having a low amount of relationship capital seem to have a significantly higher 
quality information environment compared to the other firms in the sample.
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Table 17
The Effect of the Strength of the Bank Relationship on ERC Estimates Using Leading
Period Returns (weak ties)
L r = (P„ - P„.r ) t P„.z = a + /?,(*„ / W,.,„r ) + /?2ЛВ„ (*,., / r = 1,2,3,4
ABU = 1 if the company is ranked in the lowest 25% of the sample in terms of (loans from financial 
institutions/total shareholders’ equity and liabilities) at the end of year t-1
Model A A Adj./?2
LI 0.690 -0.325 0.007
L2 2.555** 1.175 0.083
L3 3.952** 5.411** 0.226
L4 4.900** 4.910** 0.201
Notes: Model LI indicates a regression which uses contemporaneous returns regressed on the level of earnings in year t, L2 indicates a 
model which uses contemporaneuos returns and one year of leading returns regressed on the level of earnings in year t, L3 and L4 are 
constructed similarly. Rankings are constructed yearly for period 1993-2001. ** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. Extreme one 
percent small and large values of the regression variables are excluded when estimating regressions. Overlapping returns are used when 
leading year's returns are included in the dependent variable. All 27 sample firms included (235 regressions).
The Strength of the Bank Relationship: excluding investment firms
As with the other determinants, it is important to control for the investment firms that are frequently 
present in the extreme dummy groups. Table 18 shows that the results practically stay the same as
Table 18
The Effect of the Strength of the Bank Relationship on ERC Estimates Using Leading 
Period Returns, Excluding Investment Firms (strong ties)
Lt= (P„ - P„.t )IP„.t=a+ /?. {X„ / MVU_, ) + /92ЛВ,., (*„ / MV„_t ) + r = 1,2,3,4
ЛВ„ = 1 if the company is ranked in the highest 25% of the sample in terms of (loans from financial
institutions/total shareholders' equity and liabilities) at the end of year t-1
Model A Рг Adj./?2
LI 0.290 0.946 0.021
L2 3.439 -0.911 0.084
L3 8.047** -4.575** 0.214
L4 8.847** -4.518** 0.214
Notes: Model LI indicates a regression which uses contemporaneous returns regressed on the level of earnings in year t, L2 indicates a 
model which uses contemporaneuos returns and one year of leading returns regressed on the level of earnings in year t, L3 and L4 are 
constructed similarly. Rankings are constructed yearly for period 1993-2001. ** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. Extreme one 
percent small and large values of the regression variables are excluded when estimating regressions. Overlapping returns are used when 
leading years' returns are included in the dependent variable. 24 sample firms included (investent firms excluded, 216 regressions).
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when the whole sample was used. Therefore, the strongest explanatory variable for the quality of 
the information environment among the sample firms seems to be the amount of bank finance 
relative to total shareholders’ equity and liabilities
The most important finding relative to the Bank RS proxy seems to be that it performs well in both 
extreme groups even when controlling for investment firms (see Table 19). Thus, it seems that 
listed companies with a relatively low amount of bank finance are more dependent on efficiently 
priced arms-length capital and give more emphasise on providing investors with timely value­
relevant disclosure and enhancing their information environment. It is also possible that these 
companies access the capital market more often to e.g. raise equity capital and therefore supply 
investors with more information on a continuous basis.
Table 19
The Effect of The Strength of The Bank Relationship on ERC Estimates Using Leading 
Period Returns, Excluding Investment Firms (weak ties)
L r = (P„ - P„_, )/P„_r =« + /?, (X„ IAiVt.r ) + рг ЯВ„ / MVU_T ) + su r = 1,2,3,4
ЛВ„ =1 if the company is ranked in the lowest 25% of the sample in terms of (loans from financial 
institutions/total shareholders equity&liabilities) at the end of year t-1
Model P> Рг Adj.В2
LI 0.866* -0.633 0.014
L2 2.816** 1.421 0.087
L3 4.605** 7.362** 0.276
L4 5.938** 7.616** 0.257
Notes: Model LI indicates a regression which uses contemporaneous returns regressed on the level of earnings in year t, L2 indicates a 
model which uses contemporaneuos returns and one year of leading returns regressed on the level of earnings in year t, L3 and L4 are 
constructed similarly. Rankings are constructed yearly for period 1993-2001. * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, ** denotes 
statistical significance at the 1% level. Extreme one percent small and large values of the regression variables are excluded when estimating 
regressions. Overlapping returns are used when leading years' returns are included in the dependent variable. 24 sample firms included 
(investent firms excluded, 216 regressions).
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6.7 Multiple Regressions
The next step is to include all of the determinants in the model to see, which is the most important 
in explaining price anticipation of earnings. Equation 36 was estimated to get a simultaneous 
estimate of the predictive power of ß2, /?3 and Д,. As before the dummies were specified so that
(P. = « + A, (X„ / MV„_,) + ß,AS,,(X JMV(36)
+ A* T„ (X, /MV„_, )+ß,XB, (X„ / МГ„_, )+
/LS1,, was one (and 0 otherwise) for the firms belonging to the smallest 25% of the firms based on 
yearly rankings in terms of market size between 1993-2001. Similarly, ÅTit was specified as one
(and 0 otherwise) for firms belonging to the smallest 25% of the firms based on yearly rankings in 
terms of total yearly trading volume in EUR between [( 1993-1994),...,(2001 -2002)]. The strength 
of the bank relationship dummy (ÅBit) was estimated by first giving a dummy of one (and 0
otherwise) to the 25% of the firms belonging to the lowest sub group based on yearly rankings of 
[loans from financial institutions/total shareholders’ equity and liabilities] and then re-estimating 
the equation using the ones that had the most relationship capital based on the same ranking.
The problem with the multiple regression approach was that as Table 7 depicts, especially size and 
trading volume are highly correlated. Because of a low sample size, this means that similar dummy 
values tend to be given to same firms in a given sample year and the model suffers from 
multicollinearity. Therefore, when estimating equation 36 the trading volume ERC ( ßi ) was 
insignificant although it has significant predictive power when used separately and the results are 
not very fruitful. When size or trading volume was left out of the regression equation 36, the model 
gave results that were very similar in terms of ERC magnitudes as those reported for the 
determinants individually. Highest explanatory power (model L4, extreme one percent outliers of 
regression variables excluded, adj. R2 of 25,2%) was obtained with a model that included a dummy 
value of one ( ÅSU ) for the smallest 25% of the sample firms based on yearly rankings of market
value between 1993-2001 and a dummy value of one (ÅBit) for firms belonging to the 25% sub
group with the lowest amount of relationship capital based on yearly rankings between 1993-2001. 
All in all, the predictive power of the multiple regressions did not improve substantially compared 
to the tests which included only a single determinant and the ERCs were of similar magnitude and
sign.
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6.8 Correlation of Change in ERC With Size, Trading Volume and The Strength of The Bank 
Relationship
Apart from the dummy methodology used to test for the significance of size, trading volume and the 
strength of the bank relationship for price anticipation of earnings, we can test for the correlation of 
change in the ERC (AERC) and the determinants. The ERCs for each firm are measured between 
1993 and 2001, with and without leading period returns, using both the change in earnings and 
earnings level as the independent variable. The estimated regressions are
(P„ -Pi,-r)IPi,-r =я + А(Д*„/МК;,_,) + *„ Dt
(Pi, - P„-r ) / P„-r = « + А (X» / MVi,-r ) + L T
Table 20
Correlation of The Change in ERC With Determinants Hypothesized To Explain Price
Anticipation of Earnings
Dt = (A -/>„_,)/P„_r = a + ß,(AXU /MV




SizeMR Trading.vol MR BR MR
D2-D1 0.017 0.019 -0.434*
D3-D1 -0.270 -0.219 -0.551**
D4-D1 -0.172 -0.093 -0.291
L2-L1 0.168 0.059 -0.153
L3-L1 -0.107 -0.216 -0.236
L4-L1 -0.145 -0.186 -0.231
N 27 27 27
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
In Mean Size In Mean TV Bank RS
D2-D1 0.028 -0.001 -0.345
D3-D1 0.232 0.277 -0.395*
D4-D1 0.193 0.251 -0.267
L2-LI 0.124 0.166 -0.165
L3-L1 0.238 0.332 -0.148
L4-L1 0.252 0.362 -0.179
N 27 27 27
Notes: Dl, D2, D3, D4, LI, L2 L3 and L4 are used to calculate an individual ERC for each firm from the accounting earnings observation 
period 1993-2001, the change in the esimates is matched with the mean rank of size (SizeMR), mean rank of trading volume 
(Trading. vol.MR), mean rank of the strength of the bank relationship (BR MR), the natural logarithm of the mean market value (In Mean 
Size), the natural logarithm of the mean trading volume (In Mean TV) and the mean ratio of loans from financial institutions to total 
shareholers' equity and liabilities for the firm between 1993-2001. * denotes significane at the 5% level (2-tailed), ** denotes significance 
at the 1% level (2-tailed).
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where т signifies the amount of leading period returns added to the dependent variable. Basically, 
ДЕКС (Dt-D\ or Lt - L\, т > 1 ) is a measure of the information, relevant for the prediction of 
the earnings for time t, contained in the price between time t - r and time t -1 for each firm i. The 
bigger the ДЕКС, the more a firm’s stock price anticipates its earnings. Due to the small amount of 
firms in the sample, only 27 observations of each category of ДЕКС are available for the 
calculations of the correlations.
Table 20 shows the results of calculating the correlation between the change in ERC and the 
determinants hypothesized to explain price anticipation of earnings. When calculating the Spearman 
correlation coefficients, every firm is given a mean rank based on its yearly ranking between 1993- 
2001 for each determinant. E.g. in terms of size it is the yearly mean rank in terms of market value 
on the first trading day of April between 1993 and 2001. It follows that a firm, which has a ranking 
of 10 has been the tenth biggest in terms of market value during the research period. Because we 
expect large firms to demonstrate larger price anticipation of earnings, there should be a negative 
correlation between ДЕКС and the rank. We can see that this is the case especially as we increase 
the time span for which ДЕКС is calculated. For the amount of trading volume in a firm’s share, the 
analogy for calculating the mean rank is similar to market value and results very similar. The 
strength of the bank relationship determinant is measured so that a firm, which has a mean rank of 1 
has had the lowest amount of loans from financial institutions divided by total shareholders’ equity 
and liabilities during the research period. Therefore, relying on the hypothesis we should witness a 
negative correlation between ДЕКС and BR MR.
Table 20 also includes Pearson correlation coefficients on the relation between ДЕКС and the 
variables used to explain price anticipation of earnings. However, when calculating the Pearson 
correlation coefficients the natural logarithm of the mean absolute value of the determinant in 
question is used. E.g. for a firm X “In Mean Size” is calculated by first calculating its mean market 
value based on the values measured on the first trading day of April in each year between 1993 and 
2001 and the taking the natural logarithm of the measured mean value. The strength of this 
approach is that we use the absolute scale rather than relying on a ranking as in the other empirical 
designs used previously. Similarly to size, “In mean TV” is the natural logarithm of the mean yearly 
trading volume in EUR for each firm measured between [1993-1994,...,2001-2002]. The “Bank 
RS” is simply mean of the absolute values calculated as [loans from financial
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institutions/shareholders ’ equity and liabilities] for the year end financial statement between 1992-
2000.
Based on the Spearman correlation coefficients in Table 20, the amount of relationship capital 
seems to have the best ability to predict cross-sectional variation in price anticipation of earnings. 
The same applies to the Pearson correlation coefficients. Although the results are statistically 
significant in only three of the 36 coefficients calculated, it is important to notice that the sign of the 
coefficients support all of the three determinants explaining price anticipation of earnings in a way 
predicted by the hypothesis the more leading year returns included in the dependent variable. The 
only exception is the information impounded in prices between t-2 and t-1 , which seems not to 
differ between the sample firms based on size, trading volume or relationship capital. This could 
mean that the differentiating effect of the determinants applies to prices anticipating earnings more 
than two years in advance. In other words, less than two years before the annual accounting 
earnings are released the stock market in Finland is able to price the share of all of the sample firms 
in a relatively similar manner relative to its earnings.
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7. CONCLUSIONS
The main purpose of this paper was to study whether we can detect cross-sectional variation in price 
anticipation of earnings in the Helsinki Stock Exchange (HEX). Previous research has not addressed 
the issue in Finland although it might be particularly interesting to see whether the price formation 
process behaves similarly relative to earnings information in a small and relatively illiquid stock 
exchange as in large international market places. The study also contributes to the research field by 
testing whether we can detect the effect of relationship capital on the quality of a firm’s information 
environment [Healy and Palepu (1993, 1995), Baiman and Verrecchia (1996), Frost (1996)] and 
consequently the ability of an individual firm’s stock price to anticipate earnings. The hypothesis is 
based on previous work by Seppänen (1999) who has established that Finnish firms with a high 
degree of private debt make less frequent disclosure (i.e. forward-looking disclosures and timely 
documents of material information) and provide less timely annual earnings information.
Empirically speaking ‘prices leading earnings’ means that because stock markets anticipate most of 
the value-relevant information reflected in accounting earnings of year t already in years t-1 and t-2, 
we can enhance the predictive power of a returns earnings regression using current period 
unexpected accounting earnings and current periods unexpected returns by including previous 
periods’ returns in the dependent variable. The extent to which an individual firm’s stock price is 
able to predict earnings is tied to the quality of its information environment, i.e. how much value­
relevant information is available to investors about the company in general.
This study uses three determinants to measure the quality of a firm’s information environment: size, 
trading volume and the amount of relationship financing. The empirical model used to measure the 
coefficient between returns and earnings, the earnings response coefficient (ERC), uses both the 
absolute change in earnings as well as earnings level as the independent variable to proxy for 
unexpected earnings. Unexpected returns, the dependent variable, are modelled both with raw 
returns and market adjusted returns. The choice of the methodological design in returns earnings 
association studies has been a subject of great debate in the 1990s. This study uses models that have 
been frequently used in the literature during the last decade [see e.g. Kothari (1992), Kothari and 
Sloan (1992), Donnelly and Walker (1995), Donnelly (1998), Kallunki and Martikainen (1997), 
Easton and Harris (1991, 1992)].
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The empirical analysis is carried out by using a sample of firms listed continuously on the HEX 
Main List between 1.4.1990-1.4.2002. For the 27 firms that fit the criteria the following data are 
retrieved from various databases at use in the Helsinki School of Economics: yearly returns 
inclusive of dividends and adjusted for capital changes, published annual accounting earnings, COC 
(Finnish Committee for Corporate Analysis) adjusted annual earnings and yearly trading volume in 
EUR. The return and trading variables are measured between the first trading day of April in year t 
and year t+1. In addition, when testing for the effect of relationship capital to explain price 
anticipation of earnings the study uses the ratio of loans from financial institutions to total 
shareholders’ equity and liabilities. These figures are calculated manually by using the companies’ 
published financial statements.
The first stage of the empirical analysis included measuring the contemporaneous association 
between returns and earnings by regressing yearly returns inclusive of dividends (defined as 
unexpected returns) between the first trading day of April in year t and t+1 to the published annual 
and COC-adjusted earnings of year t as well as the change in published annual and COC-adjusted 
earnings between year t-1 and t (defined as unexpected earnings). The results indicate that adjusting 
the annual accounting earnings does not result in a higher explanatory power or ERC mainly 
because the published annual accounting earnings and COC-adjusted earnings do not differ 
significantly in the sample based on a t-test (p=0,05). When negative earnings observations are 
excluded the explanatory power of the model increases. This is consistent with investors 
considering negative earnings to be transitory because they have a put option on the assets of the 
firm [Hayn (1995)]. The obtained ERCs are larger than in Martikainen et al. (1997) who use a 
comparable methodology and data from HEX firms between 1974-1989, which could mean that the 
value relevance of published annual accounting earnings has increased in Finland during the last 
decade.
When leading period returns of up to three previous years are added to the dependent variable the 
ERC increases substantially compared to the contemporaneous setting. When all the observations 
are pooled and extreme one percent outliers are excluded the ERC increases from 0,616 to 5,929 
when using the earnings level as the independent variable. Allowing for cross-sectional variation in 
the ERC yields an improvement from 3,786 to 8,072, respectively. Most of the improvement in the 
ERC seems to realise when two leading years’ returns are added to the dependent variable. Using 
the difference in earnings as the independent variable significantly under performs the earnings
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levels model in terms of the explanatory power of the regression model. Consequently it is not used 
when estimating the effect of the hypothesized determinants on the price anticipation of earnings.
Analysis on cross-sectional variation in the price anticipation of earnings was earned by using size 
measured by market value, trading volume in a share series and the ratio of loans from financial 
institutions to total shareholders’ equity and liabilities to proxy for the quality of a firm’s 
information environment. A dummy variable was used to differentiate between the ERC of all the 
firms in the sample and a control group. Testing for size the hypothesis was supported in terms of 
the share price of smaller firm’s having a lesser ability to predict earnings compared to the rest of 
the sample, i.e. their ERCs increased the least when leading period returns were added to the 
dependent variable. However, large firms’ prices did not have a better ability to anticipate earnings 
compared to the rest of the sample. For firms that had a lower amount of trading in their share series 
stock prices had a lesser ability to anticipate earnings. Similarly to the size proxy, the results do not 
support the most widely traded shares having a better ability to predict earnings compared to the 
rest of the sample. These results are in line with previous research conducted on the price 
anticipation of earnings [see e.g. Collins et al. (1987), Donnelly and Walker (1995) and Donnelly 
(1998)] and confirm that HEX behaves similarly to larger international stock markets in forming 
prices relative to value-relevant events that are realised in the accounting earnings of future periods.
In addition to the determinants previously used to explain price anticipation of earnings this paper 
contributes to the research field by measuring the effect of relationship capital on the information 
environment quality of a firm. In Finland, firms have traditionally used large amounts of bank debt 
and consequently had a strong relationship with their main source of capital. In this study it is 
hypothesized that firms that have maintained a stronger bank relationship in Finland during the 
sample period, which is measured by the total amount of loans from financial institutions relative to 
total shareholders’ equity and liabilities, have showed a lesser tendency to adopt improved investor 
information practices and can be labelled as still having a “stakeholder” corporate governance 
approach. Based on previous empirical findings by Seppänen (1999) using Finnish data, these firms 
are less eager to publish voluntary disclosure which is hypothesized to enhance the quality of a 
firm’s information environment.
The results support the hypothesis of firms with high amounts of relationship capital having a 
poorer quality information environment relative to the other firms in the sample, i.e. their share 
prices have a lesser ability to predict earnings. Most importantly, firms with low amounts of
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relationship capital witness the largest increase in their ERCs when leading years’ returns are added 
to the dependent variable. Thus, the relationship financing proxy seems to explain the price 
anticipation of earnings in both subgroups contrary to the size and trading volume proxy. The 
results prove that the observations made by Seppänen (1999) on the apparent lower quality 
information environment for firms with higher amounts of relationship capital in Finland are also 
evident in practice in the market’s pricing process.
Empirical results of the effect of determinants on the cross-sectional variation in price anticipation 
of earnings is confirmed by correlating the change in the ERCs of individual firms with size, trading 
volume and the strength of the bank relationship. The change in ERC is measured by first 
approximating the contemporaneous returns earnings relation and then comparing it to results 
obtained by including leading years’ returns in the dependent variable. Although the results are not 
significant partly due to small number of sample firms the correlation coefficients are of the right 
sign and support all three hypothesis.
The results in this thesis might be of interest to studies concentrating on the usefulness of analysts’ 
earnings forecast, since proof is provided on analysts’ earnings estimate horizon matching the 
period for which market’s in Finland are able to efficiently price a firm’s share vis-à-vis value 
relevant information realised in accounting earnings of future periods. Also firm-specific 
characteristics are important in defining the quality of a company’s information environment and 
the amount its share price is able to predict earnings. This might be useful information for managers 
who have to consider the cost of different financing options as equity capital might not be optimally 
priced relative to the information available about future period performance available to insiders. 
The results also confirm the basic belief of investors relating to illiquid shares of small firms not 
being as efficiently priced as the shares of larger more widely traded firms, offering potentially high 
returns but at a greater risk.
Future research on the price anticipation of earnings should continue to concentrate on improving 
the empirical designs used. In relation to the firm-specific features explaining price anticipation of 
earnings, an equation including the absolute amount of the determinants on the ‘right hand side’ of 
the empirical design would contribute to the reliability of results. In Finland, the development of the 
stock market will in time make more accurate estimations of e.g. earnings components (persistence) 
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Sample Firms Quoted on the HEX Main List 1.4.1990-1.4.2002
Company (former names during the sample period) Entry to the HEX Main List Series Ui
Amer-Yhtymä Oyj** 14.3.1977 A
Birka Line АВР 12.5.1989 В
Citycon OYJ (Kiinteistösijoitus OYJ Citicon) 22.11.1988
Fiskars OYJ 26.10.1951 A
Huhtamäki OYJ (Huhtamäki Van Leer OYJ) 21.12.1959 I
Instrumentarium OYJ 1.9.1971 A
Julius Tallberg-Kiinteistöt OYJ 18.2.1988 В
Kesko OYJ 15.5.1960 В
Kone OYJ 27.12.1961 В
Lassila&Tikanoja OYJ*** 8.1.1961
Lännen Tehtaat OYJ 8.9.1989
M-real OYJ (Metsä-Serla OYJ) 2.1.1987 в
Nokia OYJ 1.9.1915 А
Norvestia OYJ (SYP-Invest OY) 4.3.1985 В
Outokumpu OYJ 27.10.1988 А
Partek OYJ 1.9.1915
Raisio Yhtymä OYJ (Raision Tehtaat OY) 2.2.1989 V
Rautakirja OYJ 9.5.1988 А
Rautaruukki OYJ 20.10.1989 К
Silja Line OYJ (EffJohn Oy, Neptun Maritime OYJ) 1.9.1915 А
Stockmann OYJ 2.5.1942 В
Stromsdal OYJ 14.8.1989 В
Tamfelt OYJ 2.5.1942 Etu
Tamro OYJ (Spontel Oy, Tamro-Yhtymä Oy) 3.3.1986
Tietoenator (Tietotehdas Oy, TT Tieto Oy) 1.6.1984 В
Uponor OYJ (Asko OY) 6.6.1988 А
Wärtsilä OYJ (Lohja OY, Metra OYJ)**** 21.10.1974 В
Notes: * if the company has had more than one share series issued or listed this is the one used for return calculation, it is the 
more widely traded series in total EUR, prior to 1993 the one restricted only to domestic shareholders is used, ** fiscal year 
prior to 1993 ended in the end of February, numbers adjusted for 1990-1993, ***split to new Lassila&Tikanoja OYJ and 
Suominen OYJ on 1.10.2001, both currently listed on the HEX Main List and 1 old share entilted to 1 new share in both 
companies, new L&T and Suominen OYJ considered as an entity for the final sample year, **** fiscal year prior to 1993 ended 




The Difference Between Reported Earnings and COC-adjusted Earnings*
Reported accounting earnings for the fiscal year
+/- changes in inventory reserves 
+/- changes in other reserves 
+/- depreciation in excess of plan 
+/- change in pension fund liabilities
- change in other funds not recorded in the income statement as expenses 
+ change in other funds not recorded in the income statement as revenues 
+/- other corrections
COC-adjusted total earnings for the fiscal year
Notes: Most of the difference between reported accounting earnings and COC-adjusted earnings can in practice be 
attributed to “depreciation in excess of plan”. The difference can be characterized as a clear measure of earnings 
management in Finland [Kallunki and Martikainen (2003)]. The COC-adjusted earnings that were not available in the 
RIFE database were calculated from the published annual income statements of the companies. * The calculation 
principles for COC-adjusted earnings have not changed during the research period, this was checked from the 
“Financial Statement Analysis” -booklets that are published by the Finnish Committee for Corporate Analysis and 
include the recommendations for adjusting Finnish income statements.
